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ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS FOR
PRIVATE REMEDIES UNDER THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
THOMAS LEE HAZENt
Thefederal securities laws have variedprovisionsfor allocatingju-
risdiction over private actions between federal and state courts. The
securities acts differ with regard to whether concurrent state jurisdiction
exists and, if so, whether removal to federal court is available. In this
Article, Professor Hazen examines the diverse approaches of the securi-
ties laws in allocating jurisdiction and uses these approaches as a vehi-
clefor a broader study of the allocation ofjurisdiction to decidefederal
questions. In analyzing the various approaches, he considers suchfac-
tors as unformity of law, federal expertise, the hostility of state courts
tofederal actions, the overcrowding of thefederal courts and the impor-
tance ofproviding a remedy for the small investor Professor Hazen
concludes that exclusive federal jurisdiction should largely be elimi-
nated and that serious consideration should be given to banning
removal
I. INTRODUCTION
The six federal securities laws present diverse approaches to allocating
jurisdiction over private actions between federal and state courts. Jurisdic-
tional provisions for enforcement of statutory regulation can have substantial
impact on the substantive thrust of the applicable legislative scheme, espe-
cially when the jurisdictional issue is the appropriate allocation between the
state and federal judicial systems.' Questions of jurisdictional allocation in
private civil suits raise a number of issues concerning federalism as well as
specific statutory schemes. A poignant example of the magnitude of these is-
sues is found within the sphere of the securities laws, where the scope of the
regulation has far-ranging impact upon federal and state law. At a time when
t Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972, Columbia Univer-
sity. Research for this Article was supported by a grant from the North Carolina Law Center.
The author would like to thank Professor Eugene Gressman for his helpful comments; the author
takes sole responsibility for the views expressed herein.
1. See generally Cullison, State Courts, State Law, and Concurrent Jurisdiction of Federal
Questions, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 230 (1963); Fischer, Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on
Judicial Activism in the Realm of Forum Allocation Between State and Federal Courts, 34 U.
Miami L. Rev. 175 (1980); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977); Redish &
Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 311 (1976);
Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need for Additional
Appellate Capacity, 64 Calif. L. Rev. 943 (1976); Symposium, State Courts and Federalism in the
1980s, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 599 (1981). See also Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 633 (1971).
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the backlog in federal dockets continues to expand, delay in dispute resolution
necessarily acts against effective enforcement.
The federal securities laws2 play a tremendously large role in the regula-
tion of corporate conduct, a matter that traditionally has been relegated to
state control.3 In recent years the United States Supreme Court has grappled
with federal/state tensions in an attempt to determine the respective roles of
federal and state law in establishing the proper norms for internal corporate
governance matters.4 Most of the concern to date has revolved around the
interrelationship between the investor-protection thrust of the federal securi-
ties laws and the corporate-chartering function of the states' corporate en-
abling statutes.5 These substantive law disputes have spilled over into what
may be termed quasi-procedural questions. For example, this tension has sur-
faced in the recently hotly contested issue of corporate directors' power to ter-
minate shareholder derivative suits that have been brought to redress
violations of federal law.6 Federal/state tensions have not been limited to in-
ternal governance questions but have extended to the overlap between federal
securities regulation and state "blue sky" securities acts.7 Another area of re-
cent federal/state conflict has arisen in the context of implying remedies from
federal statutes, in which one of the determinative questions is whether the
coverage of the asserted remedy is one that traditionally has been within the
domain of state law.8 Notwithstanding the magnitude of the clashes between
2. The federal securities laws in chronological order are: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
77a-77aa (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. §§ 78a-78kk; Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, id. §§ 79a to 79z-z6; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, id. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb;
Investment Company Act of 1940, id. §§ 80a-1 to -52; Investment Advisers Act of 1940, id. §§ 80b-
I to -21.
3. The rules regarding internal corporate governance are derived from state legislation en-
abling the granting of corporate charters. See, e.g., ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. (2d ed.
1971).
4. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See generally Ferrara & Steinberg, A
Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule lOb-5 and The New Federalism, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 263 (1980);
Hazen, Corporate Mismanagement and The Federal Securities Act's Antifraud Provisions: A Fa-
miliar Path With Some New Detours, 20 B.C.L. Rev. 819 (1979).
5. See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
Yale L.J. 663 (1974); Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
1146 (1965); Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage, Cor-
porate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 391 [hereinafter cited as
Hazen, Corporate Chartering].
6. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.
1980); Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1029 (1981); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1017 (1980); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1129 (1979); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also Zapata Corp.
v. Maldanado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 NE.2d 994,
419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). See generally Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Interests Statutes and the Need for
a Demand on Directors in Derivative Actions, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 1122 (1980); Dent, The Power of
Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit? 75 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 96 (1980); Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder
Derivative Suits, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 1 (1980).
7. The question of this overlap recently has arisen in the context of the extent to which state
statutes governing tender offers are preempted by the federal legislation on point. See, e.p., Leroy
v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980),
probable jurisdiction noted sub nom. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 451 U.S. 968 (1981).
8. See Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co.
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state and federal law with regard to securities and corporate regulation, rela-
tively little attention has been given to the more basic question of the alloca-
tion of jurisdiction between state and federal forums. In view of the great
concern about the general overloading of federal dockets,9 this allocation issue
takes on even greater signficance. Although some changes in the present
scheme have been suggested, there has been little if any movement on this
front.
In the face of the aforementioned federal/state tensions, the various fed-
eral securities statutes collectively present three approaches to jurisdiction over
private suits to enforce the acts' respective prohibitions. The acts provide for
(1) exclusive federal jurisdiction, (2) concurrent federal and state jurisdiction,
subject to the right of removal from state court, and (3) concurrent state juris-
diction with no right of removal to federal court. The variety in approach
belies any claim of a consistently strong policy of federal uniformity and, in
light of the absence of legislative history to explain the differences, may be
nothing more than the result of unfortunate legislative apathy or inattention.
It is time that this jurisdictional scheme be reconsidered seriously. Even if
none of the changes discussed below is adopted, there is much to be learned
from an analysis of the current law. For example, many injured investors
might be well advised to pursue their federal claims in state court and to fash-
ion their pleadings accordingly.
The various jurisdictional provisions under the securities laws give rise to
a number of questions, the most significant of which may be whether there is
any reason for their lack of consistency. Additionally, there are further, more
general questions regarding the appropriate interplay between state and fed-
eral courts in federal question cases.10 Some suggestions for change have been
made. For example, the American Law Institute's study concerning the sepa-
ration of jurisdiction between state and federal courts generally disfavors ex-
clusive jurisdiction and recommends that all actions be freely removable when
there is concurrent jurisdiction." The Federal Securities Code, which the
ABA and ALI approve, would adopt the same view.' 2 At the other extreme, it
has been suggested that exclusive federal jurisdiction be expanded as part of a
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975); Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell
Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1333
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Hazen, Implied Private Remedies].
9. The general question has been given considerable attention by the American Law Insti-
tute, but to date there has been no legislative response. ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI Study]. See section III, notes
142-250 infra.
10. For example, what is the effect of recent recognition of the offensive use of collateral
estoppel in the absence of mutuality? See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); text
accompanying notes 120-41 infra.
11. ALI Study, supra note 9, at 185-87.
12. 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code §§ 171 l(a), 1822(a)(2) & accompanying comments (1980). See also
ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1409, comment 3, at 124 (tent. draft no. 2, 1973).
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proposed federal corporate-chartering law.' 3 This Article will examine these
suggested changes as well.
The securities laws in their current version provide a convenient vehicle
for the study of the allocation of jurisdiction to decide federal questions of
extreme importance. This Article will examine the application and implica-
tions of the present securities laws, justifications for the alternative jurisdic-
tional provisions, the advisability of the changes proposed by the Federal
Securities Code 14 and a suggested solution that respects both the goals and the
practicalities of the regulatory framework.
II. THE VARIOUS AND VARIED JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
A. The Statutory Scheme
Five of the six federal securities acts provide for concurrent federal and
state jurisdiction over private civil actions while granting exclusive federal ju-
risdiction over criminal proceedings and enforcement actions by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). 15 The Securities Act of 193316 and the
Trust Indenture Act of 193917 further provide that private suits brought in
state courts are not removable to federal courts. These nonremoval provisions,
which generally are said to be limited to statutes that involve strong local in-
terests,' 8 are especially surprising in light of the strong federalism strains that
permeate securities regulation.1 9 One justification for the 1933 and 1939 Acts'
grant of concurrent jurisdiction with a ban on removal is to serve injured
plaintiffs who, because of the small size of their claims, do not want to face the
13. See Young, Federal Corporate Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 41 Law & Con-
temp. Prob. 146 (Summer 1977).
14. 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code (1980). Although passage of the proposed code by Congress seems
doubtful (see Proposed Securities Code Faces Long, Uphill Struggle, 65 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1979);
Securities Reform Is All but Dead, Bus. Week, Dec. 1, 1980, at 103; Marcus, ALI Securities Pro-
posal Hits 10th Year, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 5, 1979, at 10; Plan to Revise Securities Code Lies Dormant,
Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1981, at 31, col. 3), the proposed jurisdictional provision provides a good basis
for comparison to the current motley scheme.
15. In chronoloical order of their passage: Securities Act of 1933, §22(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v(a) (1976); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 25, 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1976); Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, § 322(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 44,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1976); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 214, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976). But
see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (exclusive federal jurisdiction
for all suits).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976).
17. Id. § 77vvv.
18. E.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 28 id. § 1445(a). See, e.g., McKnett v, St.
Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1911).
Cf. Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950) (upholding the state court's right
to invokefornm non conveniens as a basis for dismissal).
Other examples of nonremovable federal causes of action brought in state court include the
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976); Magnuson-Moss Federal Warranty Act, 15 id. § 2310(d) (class
action suits with less than $50,000 in controversy).
19. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding state
tender offer statute unconstitutional and preempted by federal regulation), rev'd on other grounds,
443 U.S. 173 (1979).
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added expense that may attach to a federal Suit.2 0 On the other hand, this
dual enforcement system may be said to work against uniformity of result. It
is also a departure from parallel and companion legislation providing either
for the right of removal to federal court or for exclusive federal jurisdiction.
However, as will be developed more fully below, uniformity is not automati-
cally achieved in the federal courts either; the circuits are in unresolved con-
ffict over a number of important issus in the securities area.21 Furthermore,
state courts are bound to follow the prevailing federal law in federal question
cases, 22 and state court rulings, like those of the federal courts of appeals, are
subject to review by the Supreme Court.23
Nevertheless, the importance of uniform treatment must not be mini-
mized. Since there are now twelve circuits24 as opposed to fifty states, some
greater degree of uniformity may be achieved by federal determination. Al-
though a state court deciding federal law is bound to follow federal precedent,
the absence of unequivocally uniform federal decisions often permits state
courts to follow their own course.25 This variance in state holdings, in turn,
only further compounds the lack of uniformity that may exist among the fed-
eral circuits. Also, there have been instances of divergence between federal
and state rulings. The splits of authority that have arisen under the Securities
Act of 1933 have contributed to the uncertain state of the law that exists in
many other areas of federal securities regulation. This divergence further may
provide a significant impetus for a plaintiff to select a state forum. For exam-
ple, federal court decisions are inconclusive as to the existence of an implied
remedy under the 1933 Securities Act's general antifraud provision, section
17(a), but every state decision on point has recognized such an implied rem-
edy.26 Similarly, the federal courts uniformly have denied punitive damages
20. See text accompanying notes 240-49 infra for comment on the Acts' ban on removal.
21. Compare, e.g., Friedrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976) (defendants not liable
for § 10(b) violation when their trading on open market did not influence price of stock or plain-
tiffs' decisions to sell), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977), with Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d
228 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendant liable to traders who purchased stock on open market without
knowledge of inside information divulged by defendant in violation of§ 10(b); causation found in
plaintiffs' allegations that they would have refrained from trading if they had had the inside infor-
mation). See section III, notes 142-250 infra.
22. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947); C. Wright, Handbook on the Law of Federal
Courts § 45 (1976); Redish & Muench, supra note 1, at 314.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). See P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart &
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 439-662 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Hart & Wechsler]; Stolz, supra note 1.
24. In 1980 the Fifth Circuit was split into the new Fifth Circuit (covering the District of the
Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas) and the Eleventh Circuit (encompassing Alabama,
Florida and Georgia). Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2, 94 Stat. 1994 (to be codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 41).
25. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971), noted in 24 Vand. L. Rev. 627 (1971); Cullison, supra note 1; Note,
The State Courts and The Federal Common Law, 27 Alb. L. Rev. 73 (1963). Also see text accom-
panying notes 201-16 infra.
26. See Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule l0b-5: Implied Remedies and Section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 Va. L. Rev. 641 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hazen, Pruning
Rule l0b-5]; Horton, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act-The Wrong Place for a Private
Right, 68 Nw. U.L. Rev. 44 (1973). See also Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a)
(1976).
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under the securities acts27 while one state court recently has ruled to the con-
trary.28 These are but examples of the lack of uniformity that invites plaintiffs
to engage in forum shopping. Another negative aspect of the 1933 Act's cur-
rent allocation of private enforcement jurisdiction is the difficulty of establish-
ing predictability of result. The securities laws provide guides in structuring
transactions. Any resultant lack of uniformity necessarily inhibits certainty in
planning, a value that has become increasingly important in recent years.29
Accordingly, in considering the benefits to be gained by allowing state court
jurisdiction, one must be mindful of the foregoing potential drawbacks. As
will be seen below, notwithstanding these disadvantages, the 1933 Act's alloca-
tion formula has a great deal to commend it.
With the 1933 Act's concurrent, nonremovable state jurisdiction at one
extreme, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, with its grant of exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction over all actions, lies at the other end of the spectrum.30 The
1934 Act has the broadest coverage of the securities acts. It provides for regu-
lation of the corporate proxy system3t and of insider trading.32 It also regu-
lates the security markets, including national exchanges, and the brokerage
industry.33 The 1934 Act further has provided the most expansive panoply of
private remedies, both express and implied. Its absence of concurrent jurisdic-
tion, which contrasts with the provisions of the other federal securities laws, is
most signficant. A major problem with exclusivity is that it may impede the
combination of state and federal claims arising from the same transaction. Al-
though the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction gives the federal court discretion to
hear the state claim, exercise of the doctrine is far from mandatory and does
not apply when the state law provides the primary basis of the suit.34 Further-
more, a few state courts have held that a federal securities violation cannot be
raised as a defense to a state law contract claim.35 This position detracts sig-
nificantly from the statutory declaration that all contracts in violation of the
27. E.g., Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975); Globus v. Law Res. Serv., Inc., 418
F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
28. Anvil Inv. Ltd. Partnership v. Thornhill Condominiums, Ltd., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 407
N.E.2d 645 (1980).
29. See, e.g., the "safe harbor" rules that were promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in response to the securities bar's clamor for guides in structuring transactions
in which the risk of noncompliance opens up a host of momentous ramifications. 17 C.F.R.
§§230.146, .147 (1981).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
31. Id. § 78n. See E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control (2d ed.
1968); 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 857-1036 (2d ed. 1961).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). See 2 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 1037-1126; Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev.
322 (1979); Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1980); Hazen,
The New Pragmatism Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 54 N.C.L. Rev. I
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Hazen, New Pragmatism].
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o, 78s (1976).
34. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
35. E.g., Investment Assocs. v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 238-89, 48
A.2d 501, 508-09 (1946), afid, 29 Del. Ch. 593, 606, 51 A.2d 572, 579 (1947); Eliasberg v. Standard
Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (1952), atid per curiam, 12 N.J. 467, 97 A.2d 437 (1953).
See text accompanying notes 109-19 infra.
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Act are void.36 Finally, it is far from clear that the justifications for exclusive
jurisdiction warrant the hardships that it may bring.37
The remaining securities acts' jurisdictional provisions follow the more
common pattern of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, subject to the
right of removal. Although this approach is favored by the American Law
Institute (ALI),38 it too is not without its problems.
B. The Current Federal Securities Jurisdictional Provisions in Operation
From the comments to the proposed Federal Securities Code, it appears
that a substantial factor behind the decision to abolish the grant of exclusive
federal jurisdiction under the Exchange Act of 1934 was the prediction that
"resort to the state courts will be relatively infrequent." 39 Although this Arti-
cle agrees with the proposed Code in taking the position that federal exclusiv-
ity should be eliminated, the impact of so expanding state court jurisdiction
should not be underestimated. The ALI's prediction may well be based on an
improper evaluation of the litigation to date. While it is true that a small
percentage of private federal securities claims are brought in state courts, the
number is low largely because the overwhelming majority of private suits con-
tain claims arising out of the 1934 Act, claims that cannot be raised in state
court. Until recently a plaintiff had no reason to attempt to formulate a securi-
ties claim without the inclusion of a 1934 Act remedy. However, the Supreme
Court has now reduced the scope of implied remedies under SEC rule lOb-5,40
under the proxy rules4' and under the tender offer provisions42 as well as the
scope of the express prohibition against insider short-swing profits.43
Recent Supreme Court decisions thus have made the climate less condu-
cive to 1934 Act claims and relatively more receptive to claims under the Se-
curities Act of 1933.44 For example, the 1933 Act's express liability provisions
for misstatements and omissions45 allow recovery without a showing of scien-
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976).
37. See 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822 (1980).
38. ALI Study, note 9 supra; 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822(a)(2) (1980).
39. ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1518, comment 6 (tent. draft no. 3, 1973).
40. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Rule lOb-5 is codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
41. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
42. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S.
49 (1975).
43. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Kern County Land
Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973). See generally Hazen, New Pragmatism,
supra note 32.
44. See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 Geo. L.J. 891 (1977). See also Freeman, A Study in Contrasts:
The Warren and Burger Courts' Approach to the Securities Laws, 83 Dick. L. Rev. 183 (1978);
Whitaker & Rotch, The Supreme Court and The Counterrevolution in Securities Regulation, 30
Ala. L. Rev. 335 (1979).
45. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1(2) (1976). See, e.g., Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 695 (5th Cir. 1971); Feit v. Leasco Data
Proc. Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The Bar-
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ter, while rule lOb-5 does not.46 Furthermore, the Supreme Court now has
taken a no-scienter approach to section 17(a) of the 1933 Act while reaffirming
its scienter requirement for actions under the 1934 Act's rule IOb-5.47 It is thus
to be expected that the amount of 1933 Act litigation will increase dramati-
cally. Apart from the Securities Act, there hgs been a dearth of non-1934 Act
private securities litigation, at both the federal and state levels; there is no
reason to expect any change, regardless of the jurisdictional provisions.
Even before the foregoing new incentives for the 1933 Act litigation, the
volume of state court litigation was not insignificant. In general, the state
courts have not shirked their responsibility to hear federal securities claims
that are properly before them.48 Fears of hostility to the federal cause of ac-
tion4 9 are unjustified. Receptivity exists even in those decisions in which the
federal claim must fail on the merits. However, the state courts have not hesi-
tated to dismiss such suits,50 thereby displaying the proper balance between
investor protection and the specter of overzealous enforcement. Not only have
the state courts been duly watchful of investor protection under the express
liability provisions, they have been willing to recognize implied remedies
when necessary to carry out the federal enforcement scheme.5' Even the 1934
Act's grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction has not precluded some state
courts from looking to the federal law by analogy52 or from permitting use of
chris Case (pts. 1-2), 55 Va. L. Rev. 1, 199 (1969); Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation
Under Section 12(2) and How it Compares with Rule lOb-5, 13 Hous. L. Rev. 231 (1976).
46. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
47. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). Although Aaron was an SEC enforcement action, it
has impact for the potential implied remedy under section 17(a). See Hazen, Symposium Intro-
duction-The Supreme Court and the Securities Laws: Has the Pendulum Slowed?, 30 Emory
LU. 5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hazen, Pendulum].
48. See, e.g., Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381 (Del Ch. 1961) (Investment Company Act of 1940);
Guardian Inv. Corp. v. Rubinstein, 192 A.2d 296 (D.C. 1963) (1933 Act); Peoples Bank v. North
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 139 Ga. App. 405, 228 S.E.2d 334 (1976) (1933 Act); Anvil Inv. Ltd. Partner-
ship v. Thornhill Condominiums, Ltd., 85 I11. App. 3d 1108, 407 N.E.2d 645 (1980) (1933 Act);
United States Trust Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 57 A.D.2d 285, 394 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1977), aff'd, 45
N.Y.2d 869, 382 N.E.2d 1355, 410 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1978) (Trust Indenture Act of 1939); Levine v.
Silverman, 43 Misc. 2d 415, 251 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (recognizing 1933 Act claim but
dismissing Investment Advisers Act of 1940 cause of action).
49. See Note, The Securities Exchange Act and the Rule of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 89
Yale L.J. 95, 110-13 (1979).
50. See, e.g., Kalav v. Pitt, 18 Ariz. App. 478, 503 P.2d 833 (1972); Rushing v. Williams, 125
Ga. App. 601, 188 S.E.2d 437 (1972); Sharp v. Idaho Inv. Corp., 95 Idaho 113, 504 P.2d 386
(1972); Coastal Finance Corp. v. Coastal Finance Corp., 387 A.2d 1373 (R.I. 1978); Sibley v. Horn
Advertising, Inc., 505 S.W.2d 417 ('ex. Civ. App. 1974); Northrop v. duPont, 210 Va. 709, 173
S.E.2d 839 (1970).
51. E.g., Unit, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 304 A.2d 320 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973);
Anvil Inv. Ltd. Partnership v. Thornhill Condominiums, Ltd., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 407 N.E.2d
645 (1980); Wolfson v. Ubile [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,280 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1977), afld mem., 78 A.D.2d 612, 432 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1980). See Hazen, Pruning Rule
lOb-5, supra note 26, at 653. See also Watling, Lerchen & Co. v. Ormond, 86 Mich. App. 238, 272
N.W.2d 614 (1978).
52. Twomey v. Michum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222
(1968); Williams v. Bartell, 34 Misc. 2d 552, 226 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct.), modified on other
grounds, 16 A.D.2d 21, 225 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1962). See, e.g., Herron Northwest, Inc. v. Danskin, 78
Wash. 2d 500,476 P.2d 702 (1970). But see, e.g., Malkan v. General Transistor Corp., 27 Misc. 2d
677, 207 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Mekrut v. Gould, 16 Misc. 2d 326, 188 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup.
Ct. 1959). See text accompanying notes 95-101 infra.
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a federal claim as a defense to a state law cause of action.5 3 The only clear
evidence of an aversion to a federal claim arose in the context of a strong
dissent that took the position that Congress does not have the constitutional
power to vest state courts with jurisdiction,54 a position that finds little, if any,
support elsewhere. 55
One of the first questions to arise with regard to state court determination
of federal claims is the extent to which the state court must follow federal
procedural rules. This issue was created by the ambiguities of the current
scheme. Although conferring concurrent jurisdiction upon the state courts, the
1933 Act is silent as to the types of facts or in-state contacts that will confer
jurisdiction upon a particular state court.56 A similar silence is found in the
other grants of concurrent jurisdiction,57 and the silence would continue under
the ALI's Federal Securities Code.58 The only possible guidance comes from
the clause of the 1933 Act that permits suit in the district where the transaction
occurred or "wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts
business." 59 A broad reading might give this clause jurisdictional significance,
which would in turn thrust upon a state court the power-if not the obliga-
tion 60-to hear the federal claim. The better view is that this clause merely
deals with venue and is not jurisdictional.6 1 Otherwise, state courts might be
forced to decide cases that they have no interest in hearing.
Two New York trial court decisions have taken the view that state court
jurisdiction is created in the situs of the transaction.62 This reading generally
will enable the investor to sue in his own state court but will prevent the de-
fendant from being dragged into a court in a state with which he has had
minimal contact and where trial would be cumbersome to him. However, the
question may be more conceptual than real. Even if the current provisions
were viewed as jurisdictional, the doctrine offorum non conveniens presuma-
bly could be invoked by a state court not wishing to hear the case. 63 Nonethe-
53. E.g., Gregory-Massari, Inc. v. Purkitt, 1 Cal. App. 3d 968, 82 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1969); John-
son, Lane, Space, Smith & Co. v. Lenny, 129 Ga. App. 55, 198 S.E.2d 923 (1973); Birenbaum v.
Bache & Co., 555 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). But see, e.g., New York Stock Exch. v.
Pickard & Co., 274 A.2d 148 (Del. Ch. 1971); Investment Assocs. v. Standard Power & Light
Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 238-39, 48 A.2d 501, 508-09 (1946), afid, 29 Del. Ch. 593, 606, 51 A.2d
572, 579 (1947); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (1952), aft'd per
curiam, 12 N.J. 467, 97 A.2d 437 (1953). See text accompanying notes 109-19 infra.
54. Guardian Inv. Corp. v. Rubinstein, 192 A.2d 296, 299 (D.C. 1963) (Myers, J., dissenting).
Under this view the only function of the grant of concurrent jurisdiction is to negate any federal
preemption of parallel, state-law causes of action. Id.
55. E.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See notes 193-96 and accompanying text infra.
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976).
57. See statutory citations, supra note 15.
58. See 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822(a), (f) (1980).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976). See also, e.g., 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822(a) (1980).
60. See Redish & Muench, supra note 1, at 347.
61. See Negin v. Cico Oil & Gas Co., 46 Misc. 2d 367, 259 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
62. Id.; Forster v. Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) T 91,549 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965). Cf. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148
(1976) (the broad venue provisions of the Securities Exchange Act must yield to the narrower,
more specific provisions of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976)).
63. See Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
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less, the forum non conveniens doctrine merely vests the trial court with
discretion to dismiss, without mandating dismissal. An overzealous state
court, in the name of enforcement, might exert its power unfairly over an out-
of-state defendant although the transaction took place elsewhere and there
were no in-state contact other than the defendant's presence. An express legis-
lative statement of the scope of state court in personam jurisdiction is included
in the proposed Federal Securities Code64 and would be a welcome aid in
resolving the ambiguities that currently exist.
Beyond the jurisdictional problem, there have been other procedural
questions that have raised the issue whether state or federal law controls. It
has been held that the state tribunal must look to federal law to determine the
applicable statute of limitations in a federal securities case.65 On the other
hand, in a case arising under the Securities Act of 1933 in which one issue was
the appropriate standard of appellate review of the findings of a trial judge
sitting without a jury, the Rhode Island Supreme Court looked to state law
precedent and did not discuss what the federal standard might be.66 As will be
discussed below,67 Congress could direct expressly the extent to which the
state courts must adopt federal procedure in federal-question cases. Contin-
ued legislative silence merely leaves another question unnecessarily
unresolved.
Research has disclosed two areas in which the state courts have taken a
different perspective on statutory construction than that currently prevailing in
the federal courts. The differences that do exist are pro-enforcement and thus
refute any claim, as may exist in criminal or civil rights areas, that federal
rights will suffer by transferring their enforcement to state tribunals.68 While
the Supreme Court has never reached the issue, every federal decision on
point has held that punitive damages are not recoverable in actions under the
1933 or 1934 Acts, 69 although they may be awarded in pendent state claims. 70
In contrast, the Illinois Intermediate Court of Appeals, citing primarily Illinois
cases, rejected the scant and ambiguous (in the court's view) federal case law
in favor of the rule that punitive damages are generally awardable in the ab-
sence of a statutory prohibition.7' The decision might well have been other-
wise had there been a clearer, more definitive federal court of appeals
64. 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822 (1980).
65. Green v. Karol, 168 Ind. App. 467, 344 N.E.2d 106 (1976). This "reverse Erie" solution
mirrors the federal courts' response in diversity cases. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99 (1945).
66. Coastal Finance Corp. v. Coastal Finance Corp., 387 A.2d 1373, 1377 (R.I. 1978).
67. See notes 197-200 and accompanying text infra.
68. See section III. A., notes 142-85 and accompanying text infra.
69. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Globus v. Law Res.
Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
70. See Petrites v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1981); Young v. Taylor, 466
F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1972); Darling & Co. v. Klouman, 87 F.R.D. 756 (N.D. I11. 1980).




precedent and most certainly represents an arguable interpretation of the ap-
plicable federal statute.
The second area in which state courts have shown a more favorable dis-
position toward the injured investor is the recognition of implied remedies.
The Supreme Court recently has been taking a much closer look at the general
question of implied remedies as well as those specifically asserted under the
securities laws.72 From these decisions has emerged the clear lesson that im-
plied remedies should be recognized, if at all, only in cases of clear legislative
intent.73 It has been suggested by one observer that state courts need not feel
constrained by Supreme Court decisions in applying their common law and
accordingly should be more liberal in recognizing implied remedies. 74 Recent
rulings seem to bear out such a predisposition even when dealing with federal
statutes. The most notable example of the state courts' predilection for im-
plied remedies is found amidst the lower federal courts' disagreement as to
whether a private remedy is to be implied under section 17(a) of the 1933
Act.75 No state court has refused such a remedy, with each court either ex-
pressly acknowledging its existence or leaving the question open.76 Although
these decisions can be characterized as more pro-enforcement than the current
federal case law, it cannot fairly be said that they represent a clear departure
from the federal interpretation since there have been a number of recent fed-
eral decisions that continue to recognize the section 17(a) remedy.77
72. See Goldstein, A Swann Song For Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13
Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 1 (1978); McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of
Action: Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 Dick. L. Rev. 167 (1976); Morrison, Rights Without
Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal Courts Out of the Business of Protecting Federal
Rights, 30 Rutgers L. Rev. 841 (1977); Mowe, Federal Statutes and Implied Private Actions, 55
Or. L. Rev. 3 (1976); Pillai, Negative Implication: The Demise of Private Rights of Action in the
Federal Courts, 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1978); Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act After
Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. Law. 117 (1978); Ratner, The Demise of
the Implied Private Right of Action in the Supreme Court, 11 Inst. Sec. Reg. 289 (1980); Stein-
berg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 Notre Dame Law. 33 (1979). See
note 107 infra.
73. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 650 F.2d 342
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3098 (1981); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294
(D. Del. 1980); Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981); Cunha
v. Ward Foods, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 830 (D. Hawaii 1980); Cambridge Fund, Inc. v. Abella, 501 F.
Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See Hazen, Implied Private Remedies, supra note 8. See also, e.g.,
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing implied remedy under the Commodities
Exchange Act), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); Bratton v. Shiffrin, 635 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir.
1980) (recognizing implied remedy under Federal Aviation Act), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123
(1981).
74. Note, Implied Causes of Action in the State Courts, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1243 (1978).
75. See Hazen, Pruning Rule lOb-5, supra note 26; Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933 After Naflaln and Redington, 68 Geo. L.J. 163 (1979).
76. See note 51 supra.
77. See, e.g., Stephinson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1980); Kirshner
v. United States, 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979); Roth v. Bank of
the Commonwealth, [Current] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,267 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1981); Spatz
v. Borenstein, 513 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1233 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Anschutz Corp. v. Kay
Corp., 507 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Mifflin Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334
(W.D. Pa. 1980); Cunah v. Ward Foods, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 830, 837 (D. Hawaii 1980). Contra,
Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Ingram Indus. v. Norwicki, 502 F. Supp.
1060 (E.D. Ky. 1980); Manchester Bank v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 1304
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Beyond section 17(a), the state courts have ventured even further into the
implied remedy area notwithstanding the 1934 Act's grant of exclusive federal
jurisdiction. The bulk of current federal authority holds that no remedy is to
be implied for violations of stock exchange rules, 78 but there is no Supreme
Court case on point. In a novel opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals held
that since a rule of the New York Stock Exchange is not an SEC rule, the 1934
Act's exclusive jurisdiction was not a bar to state court recognition of an im-
plied remedy for negligent violation of the rule.
79
Although it is technically true that the SEC does not actually promulgate
exchange rules, all such rules are subject to its approval.8 0 The Michigan deci-
sion is one example of state courts' lack of hostility towards federal securities
regulation. In fact, at a time when the Supreme Court is cutting back the
scope of private securities remedies, the only criticism is that the states may be
overly protective of the federally imposed standards, which is not necessarily a
negative factor. Even beyond the securities law issues, it has been suggested
that concurrent jurisdiction opens up to different perspectives the development
of uncharted areas. This new potential may be of positive value, as it mini-
mizes institutional biases and is conducive to considering all sides of un-
resolved questions.8' The added factor of the state courts' perspective may
facilitate uniformity in the long run.
Because of the necessary overlap with state law concerns, the issue of im-
plied remedies under exchange rules is not the only area in which state courts
have become involved in spite of the 1934 Act's grant of exclusive federal
jurisdiction in section 27.82 There are further examples of state courts' bor-
rowing from the federal law, notwithstanding section 27. With regard to con-
duct alleged to violate both state law and the 1934 Act, it has been indicated
that federal standards may be considered by state courts through analogy, so
long as the underlying state remedy would exist without-and therefore is not
dependent upon-the federal statute.8 3 The grant of exclusive federal juris-
diction thus may not be sufficient to keep state courts out of the area in the
face of this negligence-per-se rationale.84 Even if state courts were to go so far
(D.N.H. 1980); Freeman v. McCormack, 490 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Mendelsohn v.
Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
78. E.g., Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally Lash-
brooke, Implying a Cause of Action for Damages: Rule Violations by Registered Exchanges and
Associations, 48 U. Cin. L. Rev. 949 (1980); Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock
Exchange Rules, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 12 (1966). It has been held, however, that such rules may
provide the basis for establishing the appropriate standard of conduct under SEC rule lob-5 (17
C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (1981)). See Comment, Private Actions Under the Suitability and Supervision
Duties of Exchange and Dealer Association Rules: The Fraud Requirement, 16 San Diego L.
Rev. 773 (1979).
79. Watling, Lerchen & Co. v. Ormond, 86 Mich. App. 238, 272 N.W.2d 614 (1978).
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78s (1976).
81. See Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology and Innovation,
22 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 639, 672-80 (1981); note 167 infra.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
83. See Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr.
222 (1968), and cases cited therein.
84. Watling, Lerchen & Co. v. Ormond, 86 Mich. App. 238, 272 N.W.2d 614 (1978); Note,
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as to use the long-recognized negligence-per-se rationale to imply private rem-
edies, notwithstanding section 27's exclusive federal jurisdiction, the potential
for review by the Supreme Court85 would provide a check against undue ex-
pansion of the securities laws and lack of uniformity. Professor Loss' position
on the scope of Supreme Court review appears to be that the decision whether
to imply a remedy may not present a federal question, but substantive inter-
pretation as to the alleged violation does.86 Under this view, the states are
able to provide more enforcement opportunities than can the federal courts.
Prior to recommending the repeal of exclusive federal jurisdiction in drafting
the proposed Code, Professor Loss viewed the state court implication threat as
an "unfortunate" reason for giving a strong preclusive effect to section 27.87
The wisdom of a state's invoking negligence per se is most questionable under
a statutory scheme premised upon exclusive federal jurisdiction. Sanctioning
a state law remedy in such a circumstance is a back-door entry to concurrent
jurisdiction. In any event, federal exclusivity will not necessarily inhibit an
enforcement-oriented state court. Concurrent jurisdiction, of course, would
not eliminate the state court's negligence-per-se rationale, but the rationale
would arise with parallel consideration of the federal claim. The right of re-
moval would not help the defendant because a negligence-per-se rationale,
properly viewed, is to be decided under state, not federal, law.88 This problem
does not arise under the 1933 Act because of its ban on removal.
One clear lesson that emerges from a reading of the litigation to date is
that purchasers of securities who have been injured by material misstatements
or omissions in, or failure to file, a registration statement, and who therefore
have claims under the 1933 Act,89 would be well advised to give serious con-
sideration to a state court forum. State court resolution is particularly attrac-
tive when the controversy is not so complex as to require the federal
procedural rules that may not be available in the state tribunal. In a compli-
cated misstatement or omission case, the plaintiff very well may require the
more extensive federal discovery rules. Although many states have adopted
the federal rules, others continue to follow more cumbersome procedures.
Even so, state courts may be compelled to follow the federal rules if they are
deemed necessary to carry out the enforcement or related goals of the securi-
supra note 74. It is worthy of notice that the negligence-per-se rationale was the basis for the
seminal, federal securities implication decisions. See Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (section 17(a) of the 1933 Act); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946) (rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act).
85. 2 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 1000.
86. Id. See also Cullison, supra note I, at 230, 243-44.
87. A complaint which pleaded a violation of one of the SEC filing rules as creating a
state-law tortper se very likely would be removable as an action "arising under" federal
law-which, unfortunately, is one more reason to consider §27 as closing the door of the
state in such a case.
L. Loss, supra note 31, at 1000-01 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
88. The right of removal is discussed in section III. C., notes 223-50 and accompanying text
infra.
89. Unlike rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act, which applies to both purchases and sales, sections 11,
12 and 17(a) of the 1933 Act apply to violations in connection with a sale and therefore protect
purchasers only. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77q (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
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ties laws.90 Congress could make such procedures expressly applicable. 9 '
Whether or not the present law is retained or the proposed Code is adopted,
Congress should give serious consideration to enumeration of any procedural
protections that should apply in state court. One problem that must be kept in
mind is that state courts may become burdened with foreign and unfamiliar
procedural rules.
Even beyond the discovery rules, the federal forum will remain more at-
tractive for many plaintiffs because of the class action rules and because of the
possibility of coordinating several related suits through the panel on multidis-
trict litigation.92 Plaintiffs' counsel should be aware of state court alternatives
for those cases not presenting such complexity.
The securities cases that have arisen to date provide no basis for declaring
concurrent state court jurisdiction a failure. Although clearly more pro-en-
forcement than the relatively ambiguous law in the lower federal courts, the
state courts that have faced securities issues have shown the ability to deal
with the federal securities laws in an evenhanded manner. The 1933 Act's ban
on removal has not led to mistreatment of defendants. The advantages of fed-
eral court in many cases will steer the plaintiff there, which can be seen as
creating the proper balance between federal and state forums without includ-
ing the right of removal. Having examined the case law under the 1933 Act,
the next issue is the 1934 Act's grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Has it
achieved its purposes? The supposed advantages of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion of federal securities law violations are (1) promotion of uniform interpre-
tation, (2) greater expertise of federal judges, (3) avoidance of state courts'
hostility to "unfamiliar federal claims arising in familiar state law contract
actions" and (4) the "disparate impact" of state and federal discovery provi-
sions. 93 We already have seen that fear of state court hostility is unjustified.
An examination of the 1934 Act in both the federal and state courts reveals
that even beyond the absence of federal uniformity and questions of judicial
expertise and competence, the ends of exclusive jurisdiction are not carried
out. Furthermore, as noted above, a majority of states have either adopted or
borrowed from federal discovery rules, and Congress has the power to make
these rules expressly applicable.
If a plaintiff attempts to bring a 1934 Act claim into state court, section
27's exclusivity clearly will bar the action. 94 It will be barred even if the plain-
90. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Brown v. Western Ry., 338
U.S. 294 (1949); Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1551,
1561-64 (1960); Note, Procedural Protection For Federal Rights in State Courts, 30 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 184 (1961).
91. See notes 197-200 and accompanying text infra.
92. Multidistrict litigation may be used to consolidate or coordinate pretrial civil proceedings
pending in different districts, when such proceedings involve one or more common questions of
fact. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. III 1979).
93. Note, supra note 49, at 110-13. For a more complete discussion of the justifications for
exclusive federal jurisdiction, see section III. A., notes 136-76 and accompanying text infra.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). See, e.g., Hudson v. Burns, 29 Conn. Supp. 484, 293 A.2d 610
(Super. Ct. 1971); New York Stock Exch. v. Pickard & Co., 274 A.2d 148 (Del. Ch. 1971) (federal
counterclaim); Shearson Haydon Stone, Inc. v. Sather, 365 So. 2d 187 (Fla. App. 1979); Commu-
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tiff's complaint does not mention the 1934 Act specifically but instead states
facts that reveal such a claim but do not present a traditional common-law
theory.95 On the other hand, some state courts have found an indirect way to
hear the federal claim. For example, it has been held that violations of the
1934 Act's margin requirements dealing with payments for securities may pro-
vide the basis for a state law cause of action for breach of contract. 96 Al-
though the 1934 Act expressly declares void all contracts in violation of its
provisions, 97 the grant of exclusive jurisdiction arguably limits any affirmative
remedy to federal court. A California court has gone at least so far as to imply
that the standard of conduct established by SEC rule lb-5 can be used by
analogy in a state court fraud action.98 One court has even found an implied
state law remedy. 99 Professor Loss takes the position that in the proxy area
the state courts "should as a matter of the proper development of the state
law-look to the case law under the SECfraud rule by way of analogy."' 00
Such analogies are even more likely when, as is frequently the case, the state
blue sky law borrows from the federal scheme.' 01 These encounters with fed-
eral law belie the claim of lack of state court expertise in the area and further
detract from the uniformity that supposedly results from keeping securities
litigation out of the state courts.
While it is true that the most highly publicized, contemporary securities
litigation has taken place in the federal courts, it must not be forgotten that
state law involvement in the area predates the first federal involvement by
twenty-two years.10 2 Today all fifty states have legislation regulating securi-
ties distributions and trading in much the same manner as the federal stat-
utes. 10 3 Most private litigation in the securities area is brought under the
nity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Vigman, 330 So. 2d 211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Webster v.
Steinberg, 84 Nev. 426, 422 P.2d 894 (1968); Mitchell v. Bache & Co., 52 Misc. 2d 985, 277
N.Y.S.2d 580 (Civ. Ct. 1966); Malkan v. General Transistor Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 677, 207 N.Y.S.2d
345 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Mekrut v. Gould, 16 Misc. 2d 326, 188 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
95. Hudson v. Bums, 29 Conn. Supp. 484, 293 A.2d 610 (Super. Ct. 1971); Community Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Vigman, 330 So. 2d 211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
96. Herron Northwest, Inc. v. Danskin, 78 Wash. 2d 500, 476 P.2d 702 (1970). See 5 L. Loss,
supra note 31, at 2957: "[T]here is nothing in § 27 to prevent an action on the theory that violation
of the Exchange Act or an SEC Rule is a breach ofcontract, either express or implied." (emphasis
in original). Contra, Mitchell v. Bache & Co., 52 Misc. 2d 985, 987-89, 277 N.Y.S.2d 580, 582-83
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976). See generally Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy Awakened, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1979).
98. Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 695-700, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 222, 232-35 (1968).
99. Watling, Lerchen & Co. v. Ormond, 86 Mich. App. 238, 272 N.W.2d 614 (1979), dis-
cussed at text accompanying notes 79-83 supra. Some state courts apparently have overlooked the
jurisdictional bar. Cf. Green v. Karol, 168 Ind. App. 467, 344 N.W.2d 106 (1976) (dismissing lOb-
5 claim due to statute of limitations but not discussing the jurisdictional issue).
100. 2 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 999 (emphasis in original).
101. See, e.g., Note, Action Under State Law: Florida's Blue Sky and Common Law Alterna-
tives to Rule lob-5 for Relief in Securities Fraud, 32 U. Fla. L. Rev. 636 (1980).
102. The first blue sky law was passed in 1911. Act of Mar. 10, 1911, ch. 133, 1911 Kan. Sess.
Laws 210 (current version at Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-1252 to -1285 (1975)).
103. See generally 7A U.L.A. 567 (1978) (Uniform Securities Act); L. Loss & E. Cowett, Blue
Sky Laws (1958); J. Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on Business Promotions (1971); H. Sowards &
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various federal antifraud provisions, particularly the implied antifraud rights
of action provided by SEC rule l0b-5,t°4 the proxy 10 5 and tender offer rules'0 6
and other sections. 10 7 It certainly cannot be said that state courts lack experi-
ence and expertise with regard to common-law fraud. Furthermore, of the
1933 and 1934 Acts' express private remedies, only one can fairly be said to be
foreign to state statutory or common law.108 And, as pointed out above with
regard to implied remedies, it is far from clear that even a grant of exclusive
jurisdiction will keep the issue out of a state court that employs the negligence-
per-se rationale.
Even aside from the few courts that have allowed the plaintiffs 1934 Act
claim to sneak into state court, a greater problem arises with regard to exclu-
sivity and the federal claim as a defense to a cause of action based on a state
law. Although a large number of states will hear 1934 Act claims when raised
defensively, 10 9 a few influential state courts, including Delaware's, have ruled
N. Hirsch, Blue Sky Legislation (1977). For a partial bibliography of recent literature, see R.
Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation Cases and Materials 1271-72 (4th ed. 1977).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). See generally A. Bronberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Law
and Commodities Fraud (1979).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981). See generally E. Aronow & H.
Einhorn, supra note 31.
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), m(e), n(d), n(e) (1976). But see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430
U.S. 1 (1972) (denying a private remedy in the hands of a competing tender offeror).
107. Although a number of suggested, implied private remedies have been argued to the
courts, those that have been recognized involve some element of fraud, misrepresentation or de-
ception. See Climan, Civil Liability Under the Credit-Regulation Provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 206 (1978); Dropkin, Implied Civil Liability Under the
Trust Indenture Act: Trends and Prospects, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 299 (1978); Hazen, Pruning Rule lOb-
5, supra note 26; Lashbrooke, supra note 78; Lowenfels, supra note 78; Siegel, The Implication
Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1085 (1979); Note, Towards
the Development of an Implied Right of Action Under Rule 14A-8 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 27 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1010 (1977); Note, Private Rights of Action for Damages Under
Section 13(d), 32 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1980).
In general, the Supreme Court has become less receptive to implied remedies. See, e.g., Tran-
samerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560 (1979); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
See note 72 supra.
108. Two of the express private remedies deal with matters other than fraud or misrepresenta-
tion. First, section 12(1) of the 1933 Act gives a private right of action against those who fail to
comply with the Act's registration, disclosure and prospectus delivery requirements. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(1) (1976). All state securities statutes have similar provisions. Second, section 16(b) of the
1934 Act provides for disgorgement of short-swing profits by certain corporate insiders. Id.
§ 78p(b). Section 9(e) of that Act imposes liability for certain types of market manipulation, but it
is arguable whether this is divergent from the common law, or from common sense for that matter.
Id. § 78i(e).
In contrast, the 1933 Act contains two express antifraud cases of liability, id. §§ 77j, 77k(2),
while the 1934 Act recognizes liability for material misstatements (of fact) in SEC filings. Id.
§ 78r(a).
109. Gregory-Massari, Inc. v. Purkitt, I Cal. App. 3d 968, 82 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1969); Johnson,
Lane, Space, Smith & Co. v. Lenny, 129 Ga. App. 55, 198 S.E.2d 923 (1973); Michigan Nat'l Bank
v. Dunbar, 91 Mich. App. 385, 283 N.W.2d 747 (1979); J. Cliff Rahel & Co. v. Roper, 186 Neb. 34,
180 N.W.2d 682 (1970); Birenbaum v. Bache & Co., 555 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See
also Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1231 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979);
Shareholders Mgmt. Co. v. Gregory, 449 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Aetna State Bank
v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970). Cf. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Killop, 509 F. Supp.
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that they are without jurisdiction to do so.110 This minority view has been
criticized severely and even attacked as contrary to the prevailing view that
congressional power, stemming from the supremacy clause, exists to confer
jurisdiction upon the state courts. 11 Refusal to hear the defense takes away
from the injured investor the ability to use the least expensive attack on securi-
ties law violations. He cannot take the more passive route of refusing to fulfill
obligations under the challenged transactions because the alleged offender can
race to state court and thereby deny the injured party any opportunity to raise
the federal law violation. The only avenue open to the injured investor is to
go through the expense of filing suit in federal court. Such a process necessar-
ily takes the teeth out of the 1934 Act provision voiding violative contracts.
Although the exclusivity view of defenses is a minority one that apparently has
been rejected by two federal courts of appeals, "12 it was sufficiently important
to be a primary factor behind the ALI's proposal to abolish exclusive federal
jurisdiction in virtually all private actions under the securities laws.13
In the absence of revision of the Securities Acts to abolish exclusive juris-
diction, states like Delaware should abandon their minority position. By way
of analogy, state courts generally are considered to have jurisdiction to hear
federal antitrust defenses even though there is exclusive jurisdiction over af-
firmative claims,1 14 although a few state courts mistakenly have denied that
they have the power to hear the defense. 51 5
The power to hear the federal defense does not necessarily incorporate
the duty to do so. There well may be instances in which the state courts may
256 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (violation of Exchange Act is not a complete defense to action for money
due but is ground for rescission of the contract).
110. Investment Assocs. v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 238-39, 48 A.2d
501, 508-09 (1946), aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 593, 606, 51 A.2d 572, 579 (1947); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil
Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (1952), afl'd per curiam, 12 N.J. 467, 97 A.2d 437 (1953). See
generally 2 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 973-1000. See also, e.g., New York Stock Exch. v. Pickard &
Co., 274 A.2d 148 (Del. Ch. 1971) (refusal to hear 1934 Act counterclaim).
111. Professor Loss takes the position that the refusal to hear the defense is worse than Rhode
Island's refusal to enforce a federal, treble damage tight under the Emergency Price Control Act, a
refusal that was reversed in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 2 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 978-79;
see notes 193-95 and accompanying text infra.
112. See Shareholders Mgmt. Co. v. Gregory, 449 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam)
(granting stay of 1934 Act claim pending state court determination of contract and defense based
on breach of the Act's provisions); Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970)
(same).
113. 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822(a) (1980). See text accompanying notes 184-85 infra.
114. National Cigarette Serv. Co. v. Farr, 42 Colo. App. 356, 594 P.2d 603 (1979); Allied Bldg.
& Airport Serv., Inc. v. 101-103 Park Ave., Inc., 54 A.D.2d 852, 388 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1976);
Merchant Suppliers Paper Co. v. Photo-Marker Corp., 29 A.D.2d 94, 285 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1967);
The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 206 (1959). See generally 2 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law 349 (1978); Comment, The Defense of Antitrust Illegality in Contract
Actions, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 758 (1960).
115. Vaughn & Co. v. Saul, 143 Ga. App. 74, 86, 237 S.E.2d 622, 631 (1977); Burgess v. Ho-
gan, 175 So. 2d 924 (La. App. 1965); AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkin Bowling, Inc., 260 Minn.
499, 507-08, 110 N.W.2d 348, 353-54 (1961); General Talking Pictures Corp. v. De Marce, 203
Minn. 28, 33, 279 N.W. 750, 753 (1938) (alternative holding).
The power to hear the claim is implicit in the long line of cases holding that collateral anti-
trust defenses cannot be raised while federally illegal conduct that is inherent to the state claim
can be heard. See note 117 and accompanying text infra.
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wish to avoid the securities law defense. There has been at least one case' 56 in
which, notwithstanding concurrent jurisdiction, the state court refused to hear
a Public Utility Holding Company Act 1 7 defense to a utility's suit on a con-
tract to purchase an apartment complex. The court deferred to a pending SEC
administrative proceeding and suggested that the effect of the federal defense
would have been merely to complicate and protract the state law contract
claim unnecessarily. In an analogous line of cases, courts have found that a
collateral federal antitrust defense could not be raised in answer to a simple
claim for breach of contract,1 18 but this result was not based on jurisdictional
grounds. Instead, it was founded on a recognition that the courts have discre-
tion to prevent undue complication of an otherwise simple state law claim
when the antitrust issues are collateral to the transaction in question. 19 It
follows that the state courts have ample discretion to prevent harassment by
way of a federal securities law defense even in the absence of the 1934 Act's
exclusive federal jurisdiction.
C Multiple Claims, Pendent Jurisdiction and Res Judicata
The impact of the jurisdictional provisions upon multiple suits is signfi-
cant. Multiple litigation is of particular concern in the securities area because
of the overlap between federal and state law. In addition to the existence of
parallel provisions of securities regulation under state blue-sky laws, corporate
chartering statutes impose upon corporate issuers of securities a wide variety
of fiduciary obligations concerning internal corporate governance.' 20 Overlap
with state-law fiduciary principles is not limited to corporations because com-
mon-law fraud frequently will give rise to rights of action that complement
federal and state securities law suits. 1 21 Significantly, some state courts have
extended common-law fraud to negligent 122 and even innocent 23 misrepre-
sentations, as well as to the trading of securities on the basis of insider infor-
mation.124 The contraction of federal remedies under SEC rule 1 Ob-5 renders
116. Citibank, N.A. v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 58 A.D.2d 519, 395 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1977).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1976) (original version at ch. 687, § 25, 49 Stat. 835 (1935)).
118. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); Response of Carolina v. Leasco Response,
Inc., 498 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1974); Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 84 Cal. Rptr.
756 (1970); Eastman Kodak Co. v. GAF Corp., 71 A.D.2d 833, 419 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1979); Ameri-
can Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 939, 249
N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Sessions Co. v. W.A. Schaeffer Pen Co., 344 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961); Keene Corp. v. R.W. Taylor Steel Co., 594 P.2d 889 (Utah 1979).
119. See, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Schnuhl, 114 Ariz. 113, 559 P.2d 669 (1976); Ax-
iom Mkt. Res. Bureau, Inc. v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 433 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
120. See Hazen, Corrate Chartering, supra note 5. The 1934 Act expressly preserves all
common-law remedies. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) ([976).
121. See, e.g., McMenomy v. Ryden, 276 Minn. 55, 148 N.W.2d 804 (1967) (derivative suit by
investment company shareholders); Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494 (1974)
(sale of stock by corporate insider).
122. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Natl Bank v. Swartz, Bressenoff, Yavner & Jacobs,
455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972); Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974); Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979 (1972).
123. See Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 679 (1973).
124. See Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); Blakesley v. Johnson,
227 Kan. 495, 608 P.2d 908 (1980); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301
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these state remedies increasingly important. Under exclusive jurisdiction all
related claims can be heard together only if the federal court exercises its dis-
cretion to invoke pendent jurisdiction over the state claims.125 One limitation
is that once the federal claim has failed, the federal court is likely to dismiss
the state claim.126 Even if the federal court retains jurisdiction, there appears
to be some question whether it will invoke a state remedy that is not recog-
nized federally.' 27
Exclusive jurisdiction thus puts the injured investor in a dilemma. If he
wants to appeal to the state law's forward-looking view of common-law mis-
representation, he may be forced to split his claims by going into state court
for that claim and leaving his 1934 Act claim for federal litigation. In addition
to the inefficiency and expense involved, the res judicata prohibition against
splitting a cause of action may render such a tactic ineffective. By going to
federal court on a pendent basis, on the other hand, the plaintiff takes the risk
that the federal court will assume a less progressive view of the state law. Fur-
thermore, in hearing the case the federal court is likely to emphasize the fed-
eral claim at the expense of state law issues. 128 Pendent jurisdiction is
therefore far from a cure-all; 129 in many cases involving the small investor,
pendent jurisdiction will not be sufficient to encourage bringing the federal
claim, leaving a significant gap in the private enforcement scheme.' 30
That state-law issues are frequently involved in federal litigation, and
even predominate federal securities claims, is evident from the federal courts'
ability to stay the federal proceedings pending the state court outcome. The
Supreme Court recently has announced that the federal district courts have
considerable discretion in deciding whether to order a stay in an implied ac-
tion under rule lOb-5.' 31 Although courts on occasion have exercised their
discretion, 132 the general trend has been to the contrary, 133 with some courts
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969); Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494 (1974). But see Freeman
v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978) (refusing to adopt New York law expressed in Oreamuno
that corporation may not recover profits made by officers trading on inside information); Schein v.
Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975) (investor-tippees not liable to corporation for profits derived
from inside information provided by broker-tippee via president-tipper).
125. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); 5 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 2962-76.
126. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 727.
127. See Young, supra note 13, at 171. But see Susquehanna Corp. v. General Refractories
Co., 250 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa.), atfd in part per curiam, 356 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1966) (state law
remedy conditionally adequate; federal relief unnecessary).
128. Failure to give more attention to the federal claim may well result in dismissal from
federal court on the basis that the state issues predominate. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. at 726-27. See also, e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S.
605, 627 (1974); Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 910 (D. Del. 1980).
129. See 5 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 2962-76; C. Wright, supra note 22, at 74-77.
130. This is especially serious, as many federal securities law violations that involve relatively
small damages or relatively few injured parties will never be redressed even by way of administra-
tive enforcement by the SEC. See note 247 infra.
131. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
132. See Shareholders' Mgmt. Co. v. Gregory, 449 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam);
Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970). See also Baer v. Fahnestock & Co.,
565 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (stay pending New York Stock Exchange arbitration
proceeding).
133. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978); Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 499
1982]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
raising the question of whether the grant of exclusive jurisdiction precludes a
stay.' 34 Further, in light of the federal Anti-Injunction Act,'13  the federal
courts are very limited in their abiliy to stay state court proceedings pending
outcome of the federal securities suit. 136 Exclusive jurisdiction thus encour-
ages parallel state and federal litigation.
An important protection against the possible inefficiency of multiple liti-
gation is found in the related doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
It generally is held that a grant of exclusive jurisdiction does not prevent a
federal court from applying collateral estoppel, thereby giving preclusive effect
to facts determined in a prior state court litigation. 137 This may be one expla-
nation for the federal courts' reluctance to stay securities claims, but in light of
overcrowded dockets, state court determinations in appropriate cases might be
welcomed as time-savers for the federal judiciary. Also, the application of res
judicata and collateral estoppel is but another example of the dilution and
inefficiency of exclusive federal jurisdiction. The absence of concurrent state
court jurisdiction may prevent the complete claim preclusion of res judicata in
favor of the more limited issue preclusion of collateral estoppel. Concurrent
state court jurisdiction to hear the federal claim would decrease the doubling
of judicial efforts because the res judicata effect would be greater.
Two of the first district court decisions on point took the position that the
federal cause of action under the 1934 Act would be barred completely by res
judicata when the prior, parallel, state law claim was premised upon the same
F. Supp. 910, 916 (D. Del. 1980); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 810
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd per curiam, 452 F.2d 662, (2d Cir. 1971). Cf. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec.
Co., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1955) (refusal to stay federal antitrust action).
134. See LeCoz, Inc. v. District Court, 502 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1974); Merritt v. Colonial Foods,
Inc., 449 F. Supp. 910, 916 (D. Del. 1980) (citing Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, P.A.,
526 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1975)). Cf. Certified Group (USA), Inc. v. First Variable Fund Rate for
Gov't Income, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,242 (D.D.C. July 31, 1981) (declining
to abstain from deciding 1934 Act claim in deference to ongoing, state interpleader suit).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). See generally Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-In-
junction Statute, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 330 (1978); Comment, The Anti-Injunction Statute-Timing
Federal Court Stays of State Court Proceedings, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 830 (1980).
136. See, e.g., In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation, 521 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1975);
McGough v. Arlington Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1975); Jennings v. Boenning & Co., 482
F.2d 1128 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1025 (1973); Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971); Lefferts v. Silverstein, 396 F. Supp. 983 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
137. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Becher v. Contoure Labs., Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391
(1929); Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1063-68 (5th Cir. 1980); Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp.,
392 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1968); Boothe v. Baker Indus., 262 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1966). See gener-
ally Einhorn & Gray, The Preclusive Effect of State Court Determinations in Federal Actions
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 J. Corp. L. 235 (1978); Comment, Exclusive Federal
Court Jurisdiction and State Judgment Finality-The Dilemma Facing the Federal Courts, 10
Seton Hall L. Rev. 848 (1980); Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Prior State Court Findings
in Cases Within Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1978); Note, The Effect of
Prior Nonfederal Proceedings on Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Over Section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 936 (1971); Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction and The Effect ofPrior State Court Determinations, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1360 (1967); Note,
The Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effect of Prior State Suits on Actions Under SEC Rule
lOb-5, 69 Yale L.J. 606 (1960).
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essential elements. 138 Although lauded by one commentator on an election-
of-remedies basis,' 39 this res judicata' rationale generally has been rejected in
favor of a collateral estoppel approach that precludes relitigation of facts but
will not bar an action in federal court as a matter of law. 140 Under this latter,
better reasoned view, there is considerable opportunity for multiple litigation
under the 1934 Act. Creating across-the-board, concurrent state court jurisdic-
tion would put an end to the collateral estoppel/res judicata debate. The
plaintiff suing in state court would then have to assert any federal claim aris-
ing out of the same facts or be barred under the res judicata prohibition
against splitting a cause of action. Under either approach, however, the de-
fendant needs protection against multiple suits by different plaintiffs. In the
event that there are a number of potential plaintiffs, some of whom may bring
suit in state courts while others look to federal courts, the defendant is faced
with a great hardship. The proposed Federal Securities Code provides a rea-
sonable solution: limited exclusive jurisdiction that has the effect of forcing
coordination of such cases through multidistrict litigation in the federal
courts. 
14 1
The preceding discussion demonstrates some of the problems with the
current jurisdictional scheme of the federal securities laws. The securities laws
present only a microcosm ofjurisdiction-allocation questions. It thus is appro-
priate to examine the issues on a broader scale as well. Much of the teaching
of the cases discussed above has equal weight with regard to other federal-
question areas.
III. ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN FEDERAL
AND STATE COURTS
-4. Exclusive Versus Concurrent Jurisdiction
The federal district courts are vested with two types of original jurisdic-
tion, one based on diversity of citizenship, the other on questions arising under
138. Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959); Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 154 F.
Supp. 64 (D. Del. 1954).
139. 1 B. Moore, Federal Practice 10.410[2], at 1182-83 (2d ed. 1974). Election of remedies is
inappropriate in light of the 1934 Act's express provision preserving common-law remedies, 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976). See Omega Executive Serv., Inc. v. Grant, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,623 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
140. See Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); Vernitron
v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971); Klein v. Walston & Co., 432
F.2d 936, 937 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Abramson v. Penwood Inv. Corp. 392 F.2d 759 (2d
Cir. 1968); McNally v. Esmark, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. IU. 1977); Lincoln Nat'l Bank v.
Lampe, 421 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (memorandum); Puma v. Mariott, 348 F. Supp. 18 (D.
Del. 1972); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afld per
curiam, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Wellington Computer Graphics, Inc. v. Modell, 315 F. Supp.
24 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 285 F. Supp. 61 (D. Del. 1968) (memorandum); Moran
v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 279 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Pa. 1967), afld, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir.
1968). See generally Einhorn & Gray, supra note 137, at 242-48. But see In re Clinton Oil Co.
Sees. Litigation, 368 F. Supp. 813 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973) (per curiam); Dembitzer v. First Republic
Corp., [1964-65 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,566 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
141. 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1711 (1980), which is discussed at text accompanying notes 185-
86 infra.
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federal law. In order to protect out-of-state litigants from supposed prejudice
on the part of local state courts, diversity jurisdiction was granted to the fed-
eral courts by Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789.142 Today, suits premised
upon state law may be heard in a federal forum when the parties are from
diverse states and the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000.143 There has
been considerable on-going debate 144 concerning the retention of diversity ju-
risdiction, a debate that becomes increasingly heated as the congestion of fed-
eral courts spirals upward. In response to criticism and to growing federal-
docket problems, the American Law Institute proposed limitations on the fed-
eral courts' diversity jurisdiction. 145 Others have favored the elimination of
diversity jurisdiction altogether, but no such changes have been implemented
to date. One objection to the elimination of diversity jurisdiction is that many
state dockets also are overcrowded. Although the backlog in some states may
not be as dramatic or as well publicized as the federal backlog, it is a factor
that must be weighed in evaluating any question of jurisdictional allocation.
The second type of federal district court original jurisdiction, cases arising
under federal law,146 raises similar questions regarding judicial economy and
efficiency. Most current discussion, however, has been geared toward paring
down diversity of citizenship. As will be developed more fully below, reallo-
cation of federal-question cases could lessen docket pressures without compro-
mising the fundamental underpinnings of federal-question jurisdiction.
Changes such as those suggested herein for the securities laws thus would be
beneficial not only in facilitating better treatment of the substantive law issues
but also in helping to relieve the caseload problem.
The Judicial Code generally provides for federal-question jurisdiction in
civil actions regardless of the amount in controversy. 147 In addition to juris-
diction over criminal offenses' 48 and actions involving agencies,' 49 both of
142. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). See generally Hart & Wechsler, supra note 23, at 1050-1102
(2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1977); 13 C, Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Jurisdiction § 3601 (1976); Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv. L. Rev.
483 (1928).
144. Compare, e.g., Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 Yale L.J. 7 (1963);
Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 Harv. J. Leg. 403 (1979); and Parker, Dual Sover-
eignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L. Rev. 407 (1956), with Burger, The State of the Federal
Judiciary-1979, 65 A.B.A.J. 358, (1979); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law In-
stitute, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1968); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 Cornell L.Q. 499 (1928); and Kastenmeier & Remington, Court Re-
form and Access to Justice: A Legislative Perspective, 16 Harv. J. Leg. 301, 311-18 (1979). See C.
Wright, supra note 22, at 87 nn.16 & 17. See also Bartels, Recent Expansion in Federal Jurisdic-
tion: A Call for Restraint, 55 St. John's L. Rev. 219 (1981).
145. ALI Study, supra note 9. See, e.g., C. Wright, supra note 22, at 88; Currie, supra note
144.
146. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1981). See generally C. Wright, supra note 22, at 63-84;
Aycock, Introduction to Certain Members of the Federal Question Family, 49 N.C.L, Rev. 1
(1970); Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 17 (1947);
Mishkin, The Federal 'Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157 (1953).
147. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1981). A minimum amount in controversy may still be
found in some statutes. Eg., 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B) (1976) ($50,000); id. § 2072(a) (Supp. IV
1980) ($10,000).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1976) (giving the district courts exclusive jurisdiction).
149. Such jurisdiction exists both for enforcement actions instituted by federal agencies and
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which are generally exclusively federal, an overwhelming number of federal
statutes invoke the district court's power with no limitation on the amount in
controversy.150 It is reasoned, presumably, that the importance of matters
such as regulation of commerce,15' which necessarily includes the Securities
Acts, warrants access to federal courts regardless of the amount in controversy.
This rationale is extended by making federal jurisdiction exclusive and to a
lesser extent by making concurrent state jurisdiction subject to removal to a
federal forum. However, when there is concurrent jurisdiction with no right of
removal, as is the case with private actions arising under the Securities Act of
1933152 and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,153 it is the plaintiff's choice of
forum, not any consideration of federalism, that governs.
Exclusive federal-question jurisdiction such as that found under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 has been justified on the basis of uniformity of
result, and judicial competency and expertise, 15 4 as well as freedom from state
court judges' sensitivity to the political climate and majoritarian pressures.
Whether these asserted advantages to the federal forum are more apparent
than real is open to serious question.155
Federal courts' expertise in matters of federal law has been accepted as a
justification for exclusive jurisdiction by the American Law Institute with re-
gard to bankruptcy, patent, copyright and antitrust suits, as well as to suits
under the Miller Act 5 6 on contracts to which the United States is a party. 5 7
for appeals from their administrative or quasi-judicial rulings. See generally K. Davis, Adminis-
trative Law Treatise (2d ed. 1978).
150. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) (civil rights cases); id. § 1337 (any act regulating commerce).
See C. Wright, supra note 22, at 87 nn.16-17.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976).
i52. 15 id. § 77v(a).
153. Id. § 77vvv.
154. See text accompanying note 93 supra. See generally D. Currie, Federal Courts 355-62
(1968); Neubome, supra note 1; Young, supra note 13, at 165-69; Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 509 (1956); Note, supra note 49, at
110-13.
155. See Fischer, supra note 1. See also notes 93-108 and accompanying text supra.
156. 40 U.S.C. § 270b (1976). See ALI Study, supra note 9, at App. E.
157. ALI Study, supra note 9, at 182-87. The comments explain:
There are good reasons for continuing exclusive jurisdiction in these classes of cases.
The federal judicial system has a well-developed machinery for handling bankruptcy
matters, as well as much experience with them. In patent and copyright cases the federal
courts again have experience, which the state courts lack, and in these cases there is a
federal interest in the monopoly conferred by the patent or copyright that is more impor-
tant than the wishes of the parties. Similar arguments, though somewhat less forceful,
can be made with regard to antitrust cases. Suits under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270b,
are discussed in detail in an appendix. For the reasons there set forth, there is an advan-
tage in requiring that all suits on Miller Act bonds-and on the similar bonds under the
Capehart Act, Koppers Co. v. Cpntinental Casual y Co., 337 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1964);
Lasley v. United States, 285 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1960); Griners' and Shaw, 1nc. P. Federal
Insurance Co., 234 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.S.C. 1964)-be brought in a single federal court.
Accordingly this subsection continues exclusive jurisdiction of such cases, and the ex-
isting venue provision requiring suit in the district, where the contract was to be per-
formed and executed, 40 U.S.C. § 270b(b), will be preserved.
Id. at 183 (footnote omitted). For arguments generally favoring exclusive jurisdiction, see Redish
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But neither the ALI nor Professor Loss, one of the premier securities scholars
and the drafter of the proposed Securities Code, finds that such compelling
federal court expertise exists in the securities area. 58 Unlike under bank-
ruptcy, and to a lesser degree, antitrust laws, private remedies under federal
securities laws are not matters unfamiliar to state judges.159
Even beyond the close analogy of federal securities law private damage
and enforcement actions to comparable state law claims, it is questionable
whether past exposure to the statutes necessarily results in expertise.16 0 Fur-
thermore, the expertise argument is self-fulfilling because it is the jurisdic-
tional provisions at issue that determine the extent of the state courts'
experience with the subject matter. Even if the state courts were able to build
up additional experience in private remedies under the securities laws, they
still would not have exposure to the criminal and SEC-originated actions that
would remain exclusively federal under the current law or under any of the
proposals discussed herein. t61 But if the key is expertise in the technical as-
pects of the securities industry, it is the SEC, not the federal courts, that should
be vested with the adjudicatory authority in question. One would hope and
certainly expect that state court judges are as able to digest relevant SEC doc-
trine as are their federal counterparts.' 62 Another argument advanced for the
retention of exclusive federal jurisdiction is the complexity of the cases, not
only in the number of parties but also in the amount of discovery and eviden-
tiary material that may be involved. Although many securities cases will be of
this magnitude, complexity is not endemic to every claim, as it may be with
antitrust cases, which are more likely to involve protracted discovery and trial
coordination of complex and multidistrict litigation problems. Especially
& Muench, supra note 1, at 311, 322 n.88; Young, supra note 13, at 167. See also Chisum, supra
note 1.
158. At present federal jurisdiction is exclusive in cases under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, while there is concurrent state and federal jurisdiction of
cases under the Securities Act of 1933, and a ban on removal of cases under that Act
brought in state court, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). So far as the legislative history shows, this
difference in these two related statutes is pure happenstance. It appears desirable to treat
the statutes in similar fashion. The leading student of these statutes has argued for con-
current jurisdiction under both statutes. Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1249, 1274-1276 (1960). Although the present proposals in § 1313 as to
scope of the action will avoid some of the problems that exclusive jurisdiction now cre-
ates, there is no compelling reason for exclusive jurisdiction. Accordingly no reference is
made to these statutes in this subsection, and elsewhere amendments are proposcd to
remove from the 1934 Act the provision for exclusive jurisdiction and to remove from
the 1933 Act the ban on removal.
ALI Study, supra note 9, at 183-84 (footnote omitted). See also 2 ALl Fed. Sec. Code § 1822(a)(2)
(1980); ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1578 & accompanying comments (tent. draft no. 3, 1973); 5 L. Loss,
supra note 31, at 977-1000, 2950-57; Note, supra note 49.
159. See notes 102-08 and accompanying text supra.
160. The confusion that currently is rampant in many lower federal court securities cases be-
lies any claim of expertise. See, e.g., Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); notes 21,
77 and accompanying text supra; note 165 infra.
161. Both types of actions call for exclusive jurisdiction, for reasons not applicable to private
remedies. Accordingly, the current law, like the proposed Code, would keep such governmental
enforcement actions out of state courts. 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822 (1980). See text accompany-
ing notes 181-85 infra.
162. But see Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1121.
[Vol. 60
SECURITIES JURISDICTION
when an investor is suing insured individuals, such as an issuer or a brokerage
house, the defendant generally is better able to bear the costs of extended liti-
gation and may be able to litigate the plaintiff out of court by exhausting his
resources. While the federal rules certainly provide procedural advantages, es-
pecially within the context of a class action, they also give the parties the abil-
ity to delay ultimate resolution of the case. This is due not only to the liberal
discovery rules but also to the docket congestion in the federal courts at both
the trial and appellate levels. Concurrent jurisdiction gives the plaintiff the
opportunity to make his choice and then live with the consequences.' 63
Two other, proferred rationales for exclusive jurisdiction-(1) the easier
achievement of uniformity of result and (2) the competence of the federal judi-
ciary-are equally questionable justifications. The potential for conflict
among the twelve federal circuits must not be underestimated. The Supreme
Court grants review in only a small number of securities cases, and even in
those areas in which the Court has granted review, the decisions tend to raise
more questions than they answer.164 It is not surprising then that the federal
courts of appeals are in conflict over monumental securities issues. 165 Further-
more, the Supreme Court can review any state court determination of federal
law. 166 The only difference in terms of uniformity that remains is a compari-
son of numbers-fifty states versus twelve circuits. This jurisdictional redun-
dancy in fact may improve the decision-making process. It recently has been
suggested that by expanding the number of potential forums, concurrent juris-
diction presents an opportunity for "polycentric norm articulation" and a bet-
ter basis for resolving areas of the law that are in conflict.
167
Perhaps the most difficult factor to weigh in the allocation balance is the
relative competence of the federal and state judiciaries. One commentator has
asserted brashly, "[B]ecause it is relatively small, the federal trial bench main-
tains a level of [technical] competence in its pool of potential appointees which
dwarfs the competence of the vastly larger pool from which state trial judges
are selected." 168 In addition to lacking an empirical basis for this assertion,
163. The streamlined federal discovery provisions are likely to benefit the plaintiff, who in the
typical securities case is not as able to bear the cost of extended litigation as is the defendant.
Concurrent jurisdiction without a right of removal allows the plaintiff to have the final say and
does not permit the defendant to subvert this choice. See generally notes 223-40 and accompany-
ing text infra.
164. See Hazen, Pendulum, supra note 47.
165. Examples include tipper and tippee liability under rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act (see note 21
supra), the existence of an implied remedy under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act (see note 77 supra)
and whether reckless conduct satisfies the scienter requirement (see, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981)).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
167. Cover, supra note 81, at 675-77. "[S]o long as such a forum is only one of several, there is
room, for a while at least, for recognition of the truly open, tentative, transitional status of norms
which do not yet command common acquiescence among all relevant authoritative courts." Id. at
680.
168. Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1121. Professor Neuborne extends this argument by further
asserting that the disparity in the "caliber of judicial clerks" also weighs heavily in favor of the
superiority of the federal judiciary. Id. at 1122. See also, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 146, at 158-59.
It recently has been pointed out that the selection and retention system in many states pro-
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Professor Neuborne's view of innate federal superiority falls far short of uni-
versal acceptance.' 69 As is generally the case with such unsubstantiated gener-
alizations, Professor Neuborne's position originates from a result-oriented
perspective. 170
Professor Neuborne further maintains that the life tenure of federal dis-
trict judges insulates them from the "majoritarian pressures" that prey upon
elected state court judges and those who are appointed for a specific term. 17 1
Once again, the proponent fails to offer evidence that state court judges are so
affected, or that federal judges are not. Such majoritarian influences are more
likely to have an effect in Professor Neuborne's area of concern, the protection
of civil rights, in which political emotions run high, than in other areas. Thus,
federal law adjudication may be necessary to ensure the protection of civil
rights, but it is not necessarily essential in the securities area-a subject that is
not likely to arouse the passions of the electorate. If anything, the state courts
have been more protective of rights created under the securities laws. 172 Addi-
tionally, life-long tenure arguably acts against superior competence and cre-
ates an unfortunate insulation from the political process. The appointment of
judges in sympathy with contemporary majoritarian views locks those views
into the judicial system. Some awareness of, and responsiveness to, the polit-
ical climate on the part of judges may be a positive factor in maintaining our
systems of checks and balances and separation of powers.' 73 Second, it has
been suggested that as time passes and some judges lose interest or acuity,
there is less to hold them accountable than with other selection and retention
procedures. 174 This argument does not question the importance of independ-
ent federal judges 175 but rather suggests that there is nothing inherent in their
selection or retention that fosters an atmosphere superior to that in state sys-
tems.176 As with many other institutions, it is the actual operation of the sys-
tem, rather than its structural aspects, that primarily affects the end product.
As pointed out above, Professor Neuborne is concerned with the protec-
tion of civil rights, a topic that traditionally has been at the forefront of fed-
vides equivalent safeguards. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship between Federal and State
Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 801, 811-14 (1981).
169. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 1, at 184-91; O'Connor, supra note 168. See also P. Car-
rington & B. Babcock, Civil Procedure, Cases and Comments on the Process of Adjudication 128-
30 (2d ed. 1977); Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainable?, 44 Tex. L. Rev.
1063 (1966); Totenberg, Will Judges Be Chosen Rationally?, 60 Jud. 93, 93-99 (1976).
170. See Neubome, supra note 1, at 1120, 1124-27. For an excellent, well-reasoned criticism
of Professor Neuborne's overgeneralizations, written from an outcome-oriented perspective, see
Fischer, supra note 1. See also, e.g., Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 22 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 605 (1981).
171. Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1127-28.
172. See text accompanying notes 68-89 supra.
173. See generally Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1099
(1977); Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, 82 Yale L.J. 227 (1972).
174. See Fischer, supra note 1, at 192-93.
175. See generally Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes
From History, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1969).
176. See O'Connor, supra note 168, at 812-13. In fact, it has been suggested that state courts
are equally as "counter-majoritarian" as federal courts. Fischer, supra note 1, at 194; Linde, supra
note 173, at 248-49.
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eral/state tensions. Constitutional and individual rights are areas in which
congressional action or federal judicial activism often has been necessary to
accomplish national goals. These areas should not be overgeneralized or nec-
essarily associated with other federal law areas. The only way to respond fully
to the problems identified by Professor Neuborne is through exclusive federal
jurisdiction. However, on the broader questions of general allocation of juris-
diction, the trend has been quite the opposite, with both Congress and com-
mentators generally favoring concurrent jurisdiction for private federal-
question litigation.177 The prevailing legislative choice can be seen as a state-
ment of "congressional neutrality on the question of institutional
competence." 178
There is much to commend the elimination of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion in the vast majority of private federal-question cases,179 including those
brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.180 In contrast, the Ameri-
can Law Institute proposals would retain exclusive federal jurisdiction over
administrative enforcement and all criminal offenses.' 8' As noted above, the
ALI also would not allow state courts to hear suits involving the bankruptcy,
patent, copyright and antitrust laws, as well as actions involving public con-
tractors under the Miller Act.' 82 The reasons for these exceptions include the
belief that these areas are sufficiently foreign to normal state-law concerns that
they are in more need of federal-court expertise, that they are overly complex
from a litigation-management perspective (especially the antitrust laws) or
that they are purely federal concerns that should not be thrust upon the states.
Even in the securities regulation area there are matters that find no com-
mon-law analogy and under the proposed Code still would involve exclusive
federal jurisdiction for civil actions. In addition to criminal prosecutions and
actions brought by the SEC, the proposed Code would retain exclusive federal
jurisdiction for civil actions brought by the Securities Investor Protection Cor-
poration (SIPC)18 3 for a protective decree in the case of broker-dealer insol-
vency and for suits to compel payment of customer claims and actions against
the SIPC.18 4 The proposed Code also would retain exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion to prorate damages in multiple suits involving the same defendant.18 5
The Code's very limited retention of exclusive jurisdiction seems a sufficient
answer to the proponents of continued federal exclusivity. The provisions re-
lating to broker-dealer insolvency are consistent with the more general recom-
mendation of retaining exclusive federal jurisdiction for federal bankruptcy
matters and with the general rule of exclusive jurisdiction for actions involving
177. See notes 156-59 and accompanying text supra.
178. Fischer, supra note 1, at 203.
179. ALI Study, supra note 9, § 1311(b).
180. 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822 (1980). But see Note, supra note 49.
181. See 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822 (1980).
182. See ALI Study, supra note 9, at App. E.
183. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(c)(3), 78aaa-Il (1976).
184. 2 ALl Fed. Sec. Code §§ 1205, 1209(e), 1210(a)(2), 1822(a)(1) (1980).
185. Id. §§ 1711, 1822(a)(1).
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federal agencies, in this case the SIPC. The provisions regarding proration of
damages in multiple civil suits are designed to continue the facilitation of
management and claim coordination through the panel on multidistrict litiga-
tion. This provision would provide the necessary insurance against state
courts being overburdened by complex litigation that they might not be
equipped to handle.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned preferences for the elimination of
exclusive federal jurisdiction in most private federal question cases, other fac-
tors must be considered before making a final judgment. How are the states to
apply the federal law? If there is to be concurrent jurisdiction, should there be
a right of removal to federal court? These questions are taken up in the sec-
tions that follow.
B. Federal Law in the State Courts
There are two threshold questions with regard to the application of fed-
eral law in the state courts: (1) Does the state court have the power to hear the
federal issues?; (2) If so, does the state court have the duty to hear the case?18 6
The power question generally is answered by congressional declaration in
terms of the express grant of either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction. In
some instances, however, there is no explicit answer, and the courts are faced
with the task of allocating jurisdiction. The judicial treatment of congres-
sional silence on the allocation issue is illustrative of the delicate balance that
must be struck. The legislative preference for concurrent jurisdiction has been
recognized by the courts. The Supreme Court long ago announced a policy of
presumptive concurrent jurisdiction, 8 7 but this presumption is not always fol-
lowed188 and has come under sharp criticism.' 89 One route is to look for the
legislative intent, but this rarely answers the question. The intricacies of the
attendant problems and the variations that exist within different federal ques-
tion areas make insurmountable the task of manufacturing legislative intent
out of whole cloth. 190 It follows that the only satisfactory solution is for Con-
gress to make a well-reasoned decision regarding the appropriate jurisdic-
186. For an excellent discussion of these two questions, see Redish & Muench, supra note I.
187. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876). See also, e.g., Bowles v. Barde Steel Co., 177
Or. 421, 164 P.2d 692 (1945).
188. The most notable example is the exclusive federal jurisdiction exercised under the anti-
trust laws. See Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 924 (D. Del. 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963); Vaughn & Co. v. Saul, 143 Ga. App. 74, 237 S,E.2d
622 (1977); Burgess v. Hogan, 175 So. 2d 924 (La. App. 1965); AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins
Bowling, Inc., 260 Minn. 499, 110 N.W.2d 348 (1961); Otis Elevator Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc.,
81 Misc. 2d 314, 366 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1975); American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres,
Inc. v. Hazel Bishop, Inc., 31 Misc. 2d 1056, 223 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Ackert v. Ausman,
29 Misc. 2d 962, 218 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
189. Fischer, supra note 1, at 203-11; Redish & Muench, supra note I, at 313-40.
190. It has been suggested that the absence of concrete legislative history is due to congres-
sional inattention and is too flimsy a basis for making such a decision. "If the desired goal is a
reasoned and deliberate allocation of jurisdiction over federal statutory claims between federal
and state courts, exclusive reliance on legislative history seems inadequate." Redish & Muench,
supra note 1, at 327. For a recent example of the Court's refusal to imply exclusive jurisdiction,
see Colorado River Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
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tional allocation for the subject matter in question.' 9 ' Even when Congress
has spoken, however, there often is a serious question whether the legislation
is the result of a deliberate decision-making process, as there generally is little
relevant legislative history. Specifically, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
point to a well-reasoned rationale for the trifurcated approach taken by the
securities laws.' 92
Once Congress has made the decision that state courts have jurisdiction,
the question then arises as to state court obligation to hear the federal claim.
Congress clearly has at least a limited power, presumably arising out of the
supremacy clause, to require state courts to hear such claims. 193 It has been
suggested, however, that the commerce clause may not properly be relied upon
to create an undue incursion upon the tenth amendment's recognition of state
sovereignty.' 94 Even in the face of such a limitation on congressional power,
securities regulation does not infringe upon the essence of state sovereignty.
Furthermore, it has been argued persuasively that congressional grants of con-
current jurisdiction generally should be viewed as imposing an obligation
upon the state courts to hear federal claims.' 95 Even if the state court has
discretion to refuse to adjudicate the federal claim under a scheme of concur-
rent jurisdiction, a state court's refusal to entertain the claim would not bar the
191. See Fischer, supra note 1, at 203-11.
192. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 997-98; Note, supra note 49, at 109-10 n.58.
193. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233-34
(1934); Note, State Enforcement, supra note 90. All such holdings, however, have been in the
context of "analogous state-created rights." C. Wright, supra note 22, at 195; Hart, The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 507-08 (1954).
Not all authorities agree that Congress has this power even to a limited degree. See Brown v.
Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See generally Redish & Muench,
supra note 1, at 341.
194. See Redish & Muench, supra note 1, at 343-45 (discussing National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). See also Young, supra note 13, at 162. The relevant theory is that
Congress cannot constitutionally burden state resources when there is no counterbalancing, fed-
eral interest in doing so. The Usery case, however, dealt with attempted, federal labor-law inter-
vention in the terms and condition of state employment, which in turn directly, affected the use of
state funds and the state treasury, a matter that goes to the essence of state sovereignty. It would
be a significant jump to apply this rationale to federal invocation of state court jurisdiction.
195. In our judgment, the view that state courts should have the power to enforce federal
claims without some accompanying obligation is inconsistent with the concept of federal
supremacy that has evolved over the years. In giving state courts the power to adjudicate
federal causes of action, presumably Congress (or, where Congress is silent, the court,
necessarily exercising a lawmaking function) has decided that the substantive policies
embodied in the federal statute creating the cause of action and the federal policies con-
cerning the administration of the federal court system are best advanced by distributing
the case burden between the state and federal courts. If the state courts could frustrate
these federal policies by simply declining to adjudicate the federal claims, then the con-
cept of federal supremacy would be considerably undercut. A second consideration is
that, under such a system, each state judiciary would decide for itself whether to accept
federal cases; thus there would be no way to regulate the allocation of burdens between
state and federal courts. The resulting unpredictability in the federal judiciary's caseload
could conceivably hinder congressional decision-making concerning the structure and
jurisdiction of the federal courts. It therefore seems unwise to presume that Congress
intended such a result unless, of course, it explicitly provides in the terms of a new stat-
ute that state courts are to be given the power but not the duty to hear federal cases.
Redish & Muench, supra note 1, at 347 (footnote omitted). But see Sandalow, Henry v. Msirppi
and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 187, 207.
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plaintiff's assertion in federal court. There have been legislative attempts to
take full advantage of the power to vest the state courts with exclusive jurisdic-
tion over federal claims. For example, Congress recently has attempted to
impose such an obligation on the state courts without giving a federal forum
for remedies of violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 196 thus evi-
dencing a broad view of constitutional congressional reach. Extension of the
1933 Act's concurrent jurisdiction without removal would be a less radical de-
parture from the norm. Therefore, no constitutional barrier would appear to
preclude the changes discussed herein.
Once it is established that the state court will hear the federal claim, ques-
tions arise concerning the law governing both procedural and substantive is-
sues in applying stare decisis to lower federal court decisions. It once was
assumed that where there was concurrent jurisdiction the plaintiff who opted
for state court wavied any rights to federal procedural protections.' 9 7 It is now
clear, however, that fundamental federal procedural rules can govern in state
court, 198 either by implication from the statutory scheme19 9 or by express con-
gressional directive.200
As pointed out above,201 exclusive federal jurisdiction does not guaranty
uniformity of result in the absence of definitive Supreme Court pronounce-
ments on point. The larger number of state jurisdictions, as compared with
the twelve circuits, necessarily increases the potential for conflict and presents
the opportunity for a wider number of variations on a single point of law. The
impact of this increased potential for conflict depends upon state court treat-
196. 15 U.s.c. § 2310 (1976). State courts have jurisdiction over all claims under the Act, but
the federal courts can hear cases only where there is more than $50,000 in controversy and in a
class action when there are no fewer than 100 claimants. For such suits the only forum is the state
court, thus leaving the right without a remedy if the state can abstain from hearing the case. See
generally Denicola, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Making Consumer Product Warranty a
Federal Case, 44 Ford. L. Rev. 273 (1975); Schroeder, Private Actions Under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1978).
197. See Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bambolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); C. Wright, supra note 22,
at 195-96.
198. C. Wright, supra note 22, at 195-96; Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Ac-
tions-The Converse of The Erie Problem?, 17 Ohio St. L.J. 384 (1956); Note, Procedural Protec-
tion, supra note 90.
199. For example, while imposing concurrent state court jurisdiction in FELA cases, congres-
sional silence on procedural issues did not prevent the Supreme Court from holding that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure control regardless of the forum. Dice v. Akron C. & Y.R.R., 342
U.S. 359 (1952); Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949); Hill, supra note 198. See also
Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 725
(1981).
200. One proposed solution to the problems raised by exclusive jurisdiction under the 1934
Act is that affirmative claims remain exclusively within the federal courts' adjudicatory authority
while all counterclaims and defenses to state causes of action be cognizable in state court, pro-
vided that the federal rules of procedure be made applicable to the federal claim. Note, supra
note 49, at 115. This seems to be a far more awkward solution than merely replacing exclusive
with concurrent state and federal jurisdiction and retaining the right of removal, even for counter-
claims and defenses, if the guaranty of a federal forum is warranted. The latter approach is taken
by the American Law Institute's proposals. ALI Study, supra note 9, at 196-200; 2 ALl Fed. Sec.
Code § 1822(a) (1980). See text accompanying notes 239-41 infra.
201. See text accompanying notes 163-68 supra.
[Vol. 60
SECURITIES JURISDICTION
ment of federal precedent.20 2 Because there have been no United States
Supreme Court decisions directly on point, it is appropriate to examine by way
of analogy the more fully developed question of how federal courts are to
determine and apply state law in diversity cases.203
After the monumental decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 2° 4 that fed-
eral courts must follow state law in diversity cases, it was unclear how the
principles of stare decisis were to be applied. It soon was held that a federal
court was bound to follow a state trial court "in the absence of more convinc-
ing evidence of what the law is.' '205 Eight years later, however, the Court held
that a federal court is not bound to follow an unreported trial court decision
which, of course, would be of questionable precedential value even in state
court. 20 6 The trend in recent years has been to give the federal courts more
flexibility: "[U]nder some conditions, federal authority may not be bound
even by an intermediate state appellate court ruling. ... [When there is no
ruling by the highest court] federal authorities must apply what they find to be
the state law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of
the State." 207 In sum, it appears that the federal courts are compelled to fol-
low the highest state court,208 as well as any clear indication by lower state
courts, leaving the federal court to "find" the state law only in the absence of
clear authority.20 9 Even though the Erie mandate is not directed to state
202. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072,1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); Note, Freeing State Courts to Disregard Lower Federal Court
Constitutional Holdings, 25 Sw. L.J. 478 (1971); Note, State Supreme Court Not Bound to Follow
Federal District Court Decision on Constitutionality of Municipal Ordinance, 24 Vand. L. Rev.
627 (1971).
203. See generally Hart & Wechsler, supra note 23, at 708-10.
204. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
205. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 178 (1940). Ironically, the state trial court
decision at issue subsequently was rejected by higher state authority. See Clark, State Law in the
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L.J. 267, 291-92
(1946).
206. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948). This ruling would
be of minimal importance in the reverse question, because there are relatively few unreported
federal securities decisions and those which do exist are found easily in the comprehensive
looseleaf reporting services: Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH); Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA).
207. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1013,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948)).
208. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (federal courts are bound to follow
forty-six-year-old state supreme court ruling).
209. See C. Wright, supra note 22, at 270-71; Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 Yale
L. 762, 775-76 (1941).
Many states have minimized further the role of the federal courts by permitting certification
of unclear questions to the state supreme courts. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 25.031 (Harrison 1976);
Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 602-36, -37 (1976); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 57 (1979); N.H. S. Ct. R. 21;
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 2.60 (Supp. 1981). This procedure has been utilized in the securities
area. See 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975), on request for certification after Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416
U.S. 386 (1974), vacating and remanding for opportunity to certify question, Schein v. Chasen,
478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973). The Court of Appeas for the Second Circuit reversed its 1974 hold-
ing after receiving the Florida Supreme Court's response to the certification request. Schein v.
Chasen, 519 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1975).
It has been suggested that this certification procedure has not proved to be "as expeditious or
as helpful as its advocates had hoped." Hart & Wechsler, supra note 23, at 710, relying on Green
v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), certified in 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
See also Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 74 Wash. 2d 679, 445 P.2d 1012 (1968).
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courts faced with a federal question, the relative hierarchy of precedential
sources seems equally applicable.
The treatment of federal law in the state courts has not been given
equivalent judicial consideration, and' most cases have arisen with regard to
constitutional issues rather than nonconstitutional federal questions. It is held
uniformly that on constitutional issues, unless there is a Supreme Court ruling,
the state courts are not bound to follow either the federal district courts or the
courts of appeals.210 The rationale in these cases is that the constitution must
be read into all areas of state substantive law: "In passing on federal constitu-
tional questions, the state courts and the lower federal courts have the same
responsibility and occupy the same position; there is parallelism but not para-
mountcy for both sets of courts are governed by the same reviewing authority
of the Supreme Court. '21 ' In federal question cases it is equally true that the
final arbiter is the United States Supreme Court. But the creation of a state
forum for a federal nonconstitutional claim, in contrast to a constitutional
claim, does not incorporate the federal law into the body of state law. Accord-
ingly, the state courts in federal question cases should give even more defer-
ence to lower federal court decisions.212 It has been suggested in an analogous
context, however, that the rules should be quite flexible, so as to allow the
judicial process to proceed normally rather than with "a pair of scissors and
paste pot. '213 But judicial creativity must not be used as a guise for disregard-
210. Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978);
United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 983 (1971); City of Chicago v. Groffman, 42 Ill. App. 3d 139, 145, 354 N.E.2d 572, 577 (1976);
Coard v. State, 43 Md. App. 146, 150, 403 A.2d 826, 829 (1979); Martineau v. Perrin, 119 N.H.
529, 531, 404 A.2d 1100, 1101 (1979); Dean v. Crisp, 536 P.2d 961, 965 (Okla. Crim. 1975); In re
H.D.O., 580 S.W.2d 421, 423-24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Annot., 147 A.L.R. 857, (1943). See also
authorities cited at note 202 supra.
211. State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 36, 214 A.2d 393, 403 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950
(1966).
212. But see Breckline v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 406 Pa. 573, 578, 178 A.2d 748, 751
(1962).
213. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 23, at 709-10. Consider the following, from Corbin,
supra note 209, at 775-76:
When the rights of a litigant are dependent on the law of a particular state, the court of
the forum must do its best (not its worst) to determine what the law is. It must use its
judicial brains, not a pair of scissors and a paste pot. Our judicial process is not mere
syllogistic deduction, except at its worst. At its best, it is the wise and experienced use of
many sources in combination-statutes, judicial opinions, treatises, prevailing mores,
custom, business practices; it is history and economics and sociology, and logic, both
inductive and deductive. Shall a litigant, by the accident of diversity and citizenship, be
deprived of the advantages of this judicial process? Shall the Supreme Court, by what
superficially appears to be an unselfish and self-denying ordinance, foreclose the use of
such a process by federal judges? It is in fact a denial ofjudges to those for whom a
court exists. We must not forget that a litigant has only one day in court. When forced
into a federal court, that is his only court. If he is denied life, liberty, or property by the
narrow syllogistic use of a state judge's worded doctrine, he is not restored by the fact
that intelligent state judges later refuse to apply that doctrine to other litigants. . . If the
federal judges use the customary judicial process in determining and applying state law
with respect to the litigating parties before them, it is quite possible that conflict may
exist between a federal decision and a state decision. . . . We may not like such conflict;
but it is an inevitable part of our judicial process, or of any other. It is by such variation
as this that the evolutionary growth of law is possible. Each litigant, whether in the
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big clear precedent in the controlling jurisdiction. Such persuasive precedent
would exist, for example, where the lower federal courts are in substantial
agreement on a federal question issue. Even where there are few federal deci-
sions on point, there is no reason to expect that a state court will willy-nilly
disregard those rulings. In fact, a number of older state court rulings have
given considerable deference to federal court determinations. 2 14 Beyond such
basic guidelines, this is not an area where the formulation of rigid standards is
appropriate.2 15 As is the case with any line of judicial decision-making, all
that properly can be asked is that the courts be duly mindful of the hierarchi-
cal structure for precedent.
Regardless of whether the federal courts are given exclusive jurisdiction,
the only real assurance of uniformity in federal question cases is review by the
Supreme Court. One effect of state court adjudication and the increased
probability of disagreement among the circuits and various states is to increase
the number of judicial conflicts that are ripe for Supreme Court review.216
The securities bar would have reason to welcome this event because it gives
the Court added incentive to resolve the uncertainties and inconsistencies that
proliferate today in the lower federal courts.21 7 The additional confficts, how-
ever, put further pressure on an already overcrowded Supreme Court docket.
Crowded federal appellate dockets have led to numerous proposed anticonges-
tion solutions, including the establishment of a national or intermediate court
of appeals.218 One variation is found in Professor Stolz's suggestion for a na-
federal or the state courts, has a right that his case shall be a part of this evolution-a live
cell in the tree of justice.
See also Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 580-82 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J.,
concurring); Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J.);
Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951) (Wyzanski, J.).
214. See, e.g., State v. Cissna, 168 Ark. 565, 569, 270 S.W. 963, 964 (1925) ("highly persua-
sive"); Lewis v. Braun, 356 Ill. 467, 475, 191 N.E. 56, 59 (1934) ("respectful consideration");
Brown v. Palmer Clay Prods. Co., 290 Mass. 108, 110, 195 N.E. 122, 123 (1935) ("respectful con-
sideration"); Harrison v. Barngrover, 72 S.W.2d 971, 974 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), cert. denied, 294
U.S. 731 (1935) ("persuasive"). A few state courts have felt bound even by lower federal court
decisions. E.g., Handy v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 230 Ala. 211, 160 So. 530 (1935). See
Annot., supra note 201; Note, State Supreme Court, supra note 202, at 629.
215. For consideration of the treatment of federal common law in state courts, see Note, The
State Courts and the Federal Common Law, 27 Alb. L. Rev. 73, 80-82 (1963):
(1) Where there is only scant federal authority at the district court level. . . [tihe
state courts should feel relatively free to examine the federal question in light of the
purposes behind the federal statute or behind the exercise of the federal power, and, if
necessary, substitute its conception of the federal policy for the determination of federal
policy made by the district courts....
(2) Where a United States Court of Appeals has passed upon the issue presented ...
"[a] state court should be very reluctant to substitute its conception of the federal policy
involved.. . .Only upon a showing of complete inconsistency with the Congressional
program involved should the state court interpose its views. ...
(3) Where there is conflicting federal authority on the issue presented, [t]he state courts
should choose that precedent which they believe to be the most likely to produce the
result which the federal program is aimed to achieve. ...
(4) When there is a rule relatively settled in the lower federal courts, .... [u]nder no
circumstances should state courts reject a well-settled federal rule.
216. It also has been said to give rise to a better basis for decision making. See note 167 supra.
217. See notes 21, 77 & 165 supra.
218. See, e.g., Commission on Rev. of the Fed. Court Appellate System, Structure and Inter-
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tional court of appeals that would review state court determinations of federal
questions and facilitate substantial reduction of the federal dockets at all levels
by transferring many federal question cases to state court.219 Such a court
coincidentally would eliminate a major rationale for coupling concurrent state
court jurisdiction with a right of removal to federal court.220 Professor Stolz's
suggestion arises in the context of criminal cases where, because of the individ-
ual rights and constitutional protections involved, the need for a federal forum
may be more compelling than in other types of cases.221 He primarily ad-
dresses the problems raised by collateral attack in federal court against state
court decisions and the more radical suggestion that a great deal of the federal
criminal docket be transferred to the states.222 Professor Stolz's recommenda-
tions are certainly worthy of serious consideration. However, because of the
relatively small burden on the Supreme Court that might result from increased
state law determination of private federal securities law litigation, such a new
national court of appeals should not be viewed as a condition precedent to
abandoning the current jurisdictional allocation.
C Concurrent Jurisdiction and Removabiliy
Subject to certain enumerated exceptions, any action brought in state
court that also falls within the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts
is removable to federal court by the defendant. 223 The underlying theory is
that both parties should have a guaranteed choice of a federal forum. A major
exception to the liberal removal statutes is the judicial interpretation that the
right of removal does not exist where the only federal question arises in the
form of a defense to a state claim.224 This limitation has fallen under much
criticism and would be narrowed substantially under the American Law Insti-
tute's proposals.2z5
nal Procedures: Recommendations for Change (1975); Federal Judicial Center, Report of the
Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court (1972); Haynsworth, A New Court to Im-
prove the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973); Symposium, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 571
(1974); Warren, The Proposed New "National Court of Appeals," 28 N.Y.C.A.B.A Rec. 627(1973); Note, The National Court of Appeals: A Constitutional "Inferior Court"?, 72 Mich. L.
Rev. 290 (1973).
219. Stolz, supra note 1, at 967-68. This proposal likely would arouse the consternation of
state court judges at the prospect of their highest court being reviewed by an "inferior" federal
court.
220. Removal would not be necessary to assure federal uniformity on major issues. It would,
however, still be necessary to give the protection of the federal rules of procedure unless they were
imposed specifically on the state courts. See notes 197-200 and accompanying text supra. Re-
moval is discussed in section III.C., notes 223-50 infra.
221. See text accompanying notes 171-72 supra.
222. Stolz, supra note 1, at 968. See also H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View
55-61 (1973); Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 64 (1948); Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Crimi-
nal Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1947).
223. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976). See generally 14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra
note 143, §§ 3721-3740 (1976): C. Wright, supra note 22, at ch. 6.
224. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908): Tennessee v. Union & Planters
Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894); Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888).
225. ALI Study, supra note 9, at 187-94. But see, e.g, Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the
Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 216, 234 (1948).
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Even beyond the limitation of removal of federal questions used as a
sword rather than a shield, there are certain enumerated exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of removability that provide notable parallels to the jurisdictional
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Trust Indenture Act of
1939.226 For example, in the face of congressional silence, there is conflicting
authority concerning whether actions brought in state court under the Fair
Labor Standards Act2 27 should be removable to federal court.2 28 Also, actions
brought in state court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) are
not removable, despite concurrent original jurisdiction in the federal district
courts. 2 2 9 It has been suggested that the rule of nonremovability "demon-
strates the weakness of the federal interest in FELA actions." 23 0
The lack of a federal interest surely cannot be the explanation for the
prohibition on removal contained in the 1933 Securities Act and the 1939
Trust Indenture Act. There is no evidence in the legislative history as to what
Congress had in mind when it drafted these provisions.231 However, legisla-
tive history is available for the deliberations that led to the adoption of the
1934 Act's exclusive jurisdictional provision.23 2 One year later, in the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Congress opted for concurrent jurisdic-
tion with no prohibition against removal.233 Yet four years later Congress
reverted to the no-removal provision of the earlier statute when it enacted the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939,234 before again omitting such a provision from
both the Investment Company Act of 1940235 and the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940.236 The easiest explanation for this checkered pattern might be con-
gressional confusion or inattention. But despite numerous opportunities to
correct any oversight, more than forty years have elapsed without alteration of
these provisions. In fact, in 1933 a proposed amendment to the 1933 Act rec-
ommended by the American Bar Association would have deleted the state
courts' concurrent jurisdiction. This amendment was opposed by Dean Lan-
dis, who was instrumental in inserting the exclusive jurisdiction provision into
the 1934 Act. He stated, "The frequent inaccessibility, burdensome procedure
and added expense of Federal court proceedings, as against State court pro-
226. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 77vvv (1976).
227. 29 id. § 216(b) (Supp. III 1979).
228. See 14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 143, § 3729, at 712, n.29, 713 n.30.
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1976). See also id. §§ 1445(b), 1445(c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
These are but the most notable, illustrative examples of nonremovability. In addition to the fore-
going there are a number of important exceptions to the general rule of removability in diversity
actions. See, e.g., id. § 1441(b) (1976); Great Northern Ry. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276 (1918);
Martin v. Snyder, 148 U.S. 663 (1893); 14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 143,
§ 3723.
230. Stolz, supra note I, at 967.
231. See Horton, supra note 26, at 56 n.32.
232. See American Distilling Co. v. Brown, 295 N.Y. 36, 40-42, 64 N.E.2d 347, 348-49 (1945)
(citing 78 Cong. Rec. 8099, 8571 (1934).
233. 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1976) (original version at ch. 687, § 25, 49 Stat. 835 (1935)).
234. Id. § 77vvv (originally enacted as ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1175 (1939)).
235. Id. § 80a-43 (original version at ch. 686, § 44, 54 Stat. 844 (1940)).
236. Id. § 80b-14 (originally enacted as ch. 686, § 214, 54 Stat. 856 (1940)).
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ceedings, makes this change undesirable. '237
At some point it becomes unrealistic to ascribe the current jurisdictional
pattern to anything other than conscious, though unexplained, legislative
choice. One leading commentator surmises that the contrast between the 1933
and 1934 Acts can be explained by a greater federal interest in uniformity.238
This same commentator, Professor Loss, was the reporter for the Federal Se-
curities Code project that would eliminate most exclusive jurisdiction.239 It
seems fairly clear that it was not the desirability of a state forum for affirma-
tive claims, but rather the desirability of permitting state courts to entertain
defenses and counterclaims, that spurred the ALI's rejection of exclusive
jurisdiction.240
The proposed Code also would eliminate the ban on removal-contained
in the 1933 Act and the Trust Indenture Act-primarily on the grounds that
the reasons for guaranteeing a state forum are negligible and that, at least in
complex cases, everyone is presumed to be better off in federal court.241 This
rationale does not address the argument raised by the scant but extant legisla-
tive history. When dealing with a relatively small or straightforward antifraud
claim, the plaintiff might well prefer state court as a matter of "convenience
and economy."242 The costs of state court litigation well may inhibit a
number of relatively small claims from ever being litigated, and this is even
more the case where the defendant can gain tactical advantage by forcing the
plaintiff into the federal system and then litigating him beyond his resources.
The goal of the securities laws' private remedies is to compensate injured in-
vestors as well as to promote enforcement. The drafters of the proposed Code
unduly minimize the importance of providing a remedy for the small inves-
tor.2 43 Further, enforcement, rather than compensation of those injured, may
237. 2 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 997 n. 526 (citing 78 Cong. Rec. 8717 (1934)).
238. Id. at 997:
[Tihe logical inference from these Delphic indications is that the exclusive federal juris-
diction provision in the 1934 act was motivated by a desire to achieve a greater uniform-
ity of construction, and perhaps a more sympathetic judicial approach, than would be
possible if the many state courts were to be kept in line only through the Supreme
Court's certiorari jurisdiction.
These justifications for exclusive jurisdiction are discussed in section 1114., notes 142-85 supra.
239. ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822(a)(1980). See text accompanying notes 179-85 supra.
240. See 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822(a), comments 1, 6, at 942-43 (1980). For discussion of
the current barrriers to 1934 Act defenses to claims asserted in state court, see text accompanying
notes 109-19 supra.
241. Id. § 1822(a), comments 2, 4, at 942-43:
Without a ban on removal, and with the likelihood that the Judicial Code will be
amended to permit removal at the instance of a single defendant [see ALI, Study of the
Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts 1981], the effect of concurrentjurisdiction is simply not to preclude a state forum when both (or all) parties prefer it.
Experience with the small amount of state court litigation under the Sec. Act and Inv.
Co. Act-the only acts other than the Sec. Ex. Act that have given rise to an appreciable
amount of private litigation-indicates that resort to the state courts will be relatively
infrequent. . . . Certainly the plaintiff's lawyer will prefer a federal court if his case is at
all unusual or complex.
242. Id. comment 3, at 942-43.
243. 2 A.L.I. Fed. Sec. Code § 1409, comment 3, at 124 (tent. draft no. 2, 1973):
The only reasons for concurrent jurisdiction are (a) to permit "Aunt Minnie deep in the
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well have been the primary basis for creating private remedies. 244 There is
great positive value in not limiting the scope of securities law enforcement to
large frauds; effective policing of the marketplace requires more.245
The guarantee of the state court forum, should the plaintiff so choose it,
would fill a current gap. There is no streamlined method of settling private
disputes analogous to the reparation proceedings that exist under the Com-
modities Exchange Act.246 There is thus no efficient mechanism for making
whole the large number of unsophisticated, small investors who become easy
prey for securities frauds and other types of SEC-prohibited conduct. 247 As
noted by the comments to the proposed Code, in complex cases the plaintiff-
investor will prefer federal court, but in other cases he may prefer state
court.24 8 The allowance of removal jurisdiction would remove the plaintiffs
choice of forum.
A loophole that would have to be closed to make effective the ban on
removal is the alleged wrongdoer's ability to secure a federal forum by win-
ning a race to the federal courthouse, through use of a declaratory judgment
action seeking a ruling that no securities violations have occurred. Similarly, a
potential securities case defendant desiring a state forum could thwart the
plaintiffs desire for a federal forum by racing to state court.2 4 9 This abuse
could be prevented by explicit statutory provision. Even in the absence of
statute, such defensive tactics generally will not be profitable. Rarely will a
suspected violator have sufficient advance notice of the injured party's inten-
tion to bring suit. Additionally, such a defensive maneuver would alert poten-
tial plaintiffs to claims of which they otherwise might not be aware.
heart of Texas" to sue in her local state court without having to travel a considerable
distance to the nearest federal court (if she can get jurisdiction locally, as very likely she
can today under the "long-arm" statutes), and (b) to avoid the complexities that have
resulted under the 1934 Act when questions under the Code arise by way of defense or
replication, etc.
See 2 Loss 973-1001; 5 id. 2949-58.
244. See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 Yale L.J. 227, 253 (1933).
245. See note 247 infra.
246. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
247. As this author previously has stated:
Many securities violations involve sufficiently large scale transactions to provide incen-
tives for injured investors to bring suit. But what about the small investor? Consider, for
example, the broker who invests an individual's ten thousand dollar life savings and
because of churning and improper investment advice the account dwindles to nothing.
Unsophisticated investors are easy prey for brokers, especially when there is little threat
of private enforcement as a result of the expense of litigating a securities case. Of course
NASD and SEC sanctions are available, but limitations on resources make investigation
and prosecution of such small scale activity unlikely.
Hazen, Administrative Enforcement: An Evaluation of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's Use of Injunctions and Other Enforcement Methods, 31 Hastings L.J. 427, 469-70 (1979).
248. 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822(a), comments 3, 4, at 942-43 (1980).
249. For an analogous situation see Care Corp. v. Kiddie Care Corp., 344 F. Supp. 12 (D. Del.
1972), in which a purchaser of stock sought a declaratory judgment that there had been no viola-
tion of state law, without mentioning the seller's potential rule lob-5 claim. The district court
denied removal and remanded to the state court, which had no jurisdiction to decide issues arising
under the 1934 Act. Had the potential federal claim arisen under the 1933 Act the state-court
declaratory judgment action would have precluded the federal forum.
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In light of the trifurcated nature of the securities laws' jurisdictional pro-
visions, it is time to consider unification in approach. 250 Proper evaluation of
the factors discussed above seems to call for the elimination of exclusive juris-
diction in favor of concurrent jurisdiction. While the weight of the American
Law Institute is behind a right of removal to federal court, this section has
pointed out that there is reason to give serious consideration to a ban on
removal.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal securities laws' varied provisions for jurisdiction over private
litigation raise a number of significant issues. Beyond their relationship to
substantive securities law, the issues raised by the current trifurcated scheme
are instructive in considering more general questions of allocation of jurisdic-
tion over federal claims. In addition to manifesting a pattern that is in need of
change, the current allocation of jurisdiction for private securities claims
presents an opportunity to examine state courts' ability to deal with federal
issues without hostility or local bias. Even if no change is in the offing, there is
reason to expect an increase in the use of the state forum.
The grant of concurrent jurisdiction for private suits brought under all of
the federal securities laws, except for those filed pursuant to the 1934 Ex-
change Act, presents avenues for injured investors that have not yet been ex-
plored to their fullest. The recent cutbacks on the scope of relief available
under the 1934 Act give new vitality to purchasers' claims under the Securities
Act of 1933 with its concurrent jurisdiction and ban on removal. The state
forum also provides the plaintiff a better opportunity to fully explore the par-
allel state law remedies, many of which have been expanded in recent years.
Contrary to the expectations of some observers, the state courts have
shown anything but hostility toward federal rights created under the securities
laws. They have been vigorous enforcers without losing sight of the potential
for overextension of private remedies. Private plaintiffs have found state fo-
rums friendly with regard to both express and implied remedies. Especially
when dealing with relatively simple securities law violations, plaintiffs should
think carefully before opting for federal court. The state cases to date gener-
ally have resulted in more effective enforcement, in contrast to certain criminal
and civil rights issues in which some state courts have shunned federal rights.
Observers long have decried the overburdened, federal judiciary and have
suggested various packages for reform. Most commentators agree that the fed-
eral courts should not be shackled with cases that belong in state court or that
are equally well-suited there. However, there is sharp dispute as to the classes
of cases that properly fall within this category. The substantive impact of fed-
eral securities regulation creates a climate conducive to state court adjudica-
tion in many cases.
There has been constant overlap between federal securities legislation and
250. See 2 ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1822(a), comments 1, 2, at 942 (1980).
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state law governing corporate conduct and securities trading. The Supreme
Court's initial expansion of federal private remedies can be viewed as a
message to the states that they should act to protect investors. Now that even
states such as Delaware have heeded the call, the Court has slowed, if not
stopped, its expansion. There has been increased state law concern due to
judicial interpretations of corporate fiduciary duties and extensions of com-
mon law fraud. Furthermore, state legislatures have been active in the securi-
ties area, and many state securities commissioners have increased significantly
their enforcement efforts. If it was ever true, it can no longer be said that
securities regulation is an area foreign to the state courts. With its decreasing
resources in the face of ever-expanding securities markets, the Securities and
Exchange Commission needs all the help available to it.
The current statutory pattern is in much need of reform. In the absence
of any indication of a reasoned basis for the present approach, the three juris-
dictional variations that currently exist should not be retained. Further, it
should be recognized that exclusive jurisdiction has created a number of
problems, such as the inability to raise in state court defenses based on Ex-
change Act violations. Since these problems outweigh the supposed advan-
tages, there is much support for substantial elimination of federal exclusivity.
Although the proposed Federal Securities Code would, with a few necessary
exceptions, opt for concurrent jurisdiction coupled with a right of removal to
federal court, retention of the 1933 Act's removal prohibition should be given
at least serious consideration. If facilitating the enforcement of relatively
small claims is the justification for concurrent jurisdiction, removal should not
be available to the alleged violator merely as a tactic to increase the time and
cost of litigation. Removal also weakens any state law claims that the plaintiff
may have, because they could be transferred to federal court subject to the
discretion to dismiss under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. The right of
removal, as is the case with exclusive jurisdiction, thus increases the chance of
multiple litigation in an area where the state courts have been duly mindful of
the federal rights involved.
Even if the current jurisdictional allocation is retained, there are a
number of areas in need of clarification. With regard to the 1934 Act's exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction, the few but influential states that refuse to hear fed-
eral claims raised as a defense to state law actions should see the error of their
ways. If not, corrective legislation may be necessary. The concurrent jurisdic-
tion provisions also create unnecessary ambiguities, such as what type of in-
state contacts are necessary to give the state court in personam jurisdiction, or
the extent to which state courts are bound to follow federal procedure. Both of
these problems are solved most easily by legislation.
Whether by way of legislative reforms or of increased awareness of in-
jured investors, the time has come to take the fullest advantage of the state
courts' ability to hear claims arising under the federal securities laws. This
utilization of state forums will provide for more efficient processing of private
claims and help relieve some of the pressure on overcrowded federal dockets.
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